diff --git a/src/test/utils/EapTLS.py b/src/test/utils/EapTLS.py
index 8a3e1c7..b5aad78 100644
--- a/src/test/utils/EapTLS.py
+++ b/src/test/utils/EapTLS.py
@@ -19,8 +19,9 @@
 import noseTlsAuthHolder as tlsAuthHolder
 from scapy_ssl_tls.ssl_tls import *
 from scapy_ssl_tls.ssl_tls_crypto import *
+from tls_cert import Key
 from socket import *
-from struct import *
+import struct
 import scapy
 from nose.tools import *
 from CordTestBase import CordTester
@@ -56,7 +57,8 @@
     server_hello_done_signature = '\x0e\x00\x00\x00'
     SERVER_HELLO = '\x02'
     SERVER_CERTIFICATE = '\x0b'
-    SERVER_HELLO_DONE = '\x0d'
+    CERTIFICATE_REQUEST = '\x0d'
+    SERVER_HELLO_DONE = '\x0e'
     SERVER_UNKNOWN = '\xff'
     HANDSHAKE = '\x16'
     CHANGE_CIPHER = '\x14'
@@ -64,30 +66,41 @@
     HDR_IDX = 0
     DATA_IDX = 1
     CB_IDX = 2
+
     CLIENT_CERT = """-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIDvTCCAqWgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCBizELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx
+MIICuDCCAiGgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCBizELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx
 CzAJBgNVBAgTAkNBMRIwEAYDVQQHEwlTb21ld2hlcmUxEzARBgNVBAoTCkNpZW5h
 IEluYy4xHjAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWD2FkbWluQGNpZW5hLmNvbTEmMCQGA1UEAxMd
-RXhhbXBsZSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkwHhcNMTYwMzExMTg1MzM2WhcN
-MTcwMzA2MTg1MzM2WjBnMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzELMAkGA1UECBMCQ0ExEzARBgNV
+RXhhbXBsZSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkwHhcNMTYwNjA2MjExMjI3WhcN
+MTcwNjAxMjExMjI3WjBnMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzELMAkGA1UECBMCQ0ExEzARBgNV
 BAoTCkNpZW5hIEluYy4xFzAVBgNVBAMUDnVzZXJAY2llbmEuY29tMR0wGwYJKoZI
-hvcNAQkBFg51c2VyQGNpZW5hLmNvbTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCC
-AQoCggEBAOxemcBsPn9tZsCa5o2JA6sQDC7A6JgCNXXl2VFzKLNNvB9PS6D7ZBsQ
-5An0zEDMNzi51q7lnrYg1XyiE4S8FzMGAFr94RlGMQJUbRD9V/oqszMX4k++iAOK
-tIA1gr3x7Zi+0tkjVSVzXTmgNnhChAamdMsjYUG5+CY9WAicXyy+VEV3zTphZZDR
-OjcjEp4m/TSXVPYPgYDXI40YZKX5BdvqykWtT/tIgZb48RS1NPyN/XkCYzl3bv21
-qx7Mc0fcEbsJBIIRYTUkfxnsilcnmLxSYO+p+DZ9uBLBzcQt+4Rd5pLSfi21WM39
-2Z2oOi3vs/OYAPAqgmi2JWOv3mePa/8CAwEAAaNPME0wEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYIKwYB
-BQUHAwIwNgYDVR0fBC8wLTAroCmgJ4YlaHR0cDovL3d3dy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9l
-eGFtcGxlX2NhLmNybDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEALBzMPDTIB6sLyPl0T6JV
-MjOkyldAVhXWiQsTjaGQGJUUe1cmUJyZbUZEc13MygXMPOM4x7z6VpXGuq1c/Vxn
-VzQ2fNnbJcIAHi/7G8W5/SQfPesIVDsHTEc4ZspPi5jlS/MVX3HOC+BDbOjdbwqP
-RX0JEr+uOyhjO+lRxG8ilMRACoBUbw1eDuVDoEBgErSUC44pq5ioDw2xelc+Y6hQ
-dmtYwfY0DbvwxHtA495frLyPcastDiT/zre7NL51MyUDPjjYjghNQEwvu66IKbQ3
-T1tJBrgI7/WI+dqhKBFolKGKTDWIHsZXQvZ1snGu/FRYzg1l+R/jT8cRB9BDwhUt
-yg==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 -----END CERTIFICATE-----"""
 
+    CLIENT_PRIV_KEY = """-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIICXAIBAAKBgQDC9eJLNv0tnpzu43OJR8q+gc7vC7+6IULlhSlduZUa4ZmLNtWu
+fLTGdHzkN9771Hh2Jqex8OEiHM5SXVeM3dgN5JL054XlhY00TxcOGXPZ3etXNo3q
+EiF2i0GRSOCtR7CNODk4VHfVATIbe/zFHcIuCIT3FAQuNltIDTukPv3O5QIDAQAB
+AoGBAJha7NgYhevzqvIov25Fs1QDP0Kh7Ne5DH0u/e+nirUyHfqkBILSI7d+6uay
+Hsiv9t9mP+CXvGgbGMVW+oc0CpUbZw4Y64jZhg/vakMuHVhpgUCyPyzjk+7Z7STg
+2B1DEAxILApU8azjrDBIRHM8q0CH6NFwJPpFjg2oi7li6hPhAkEA56e/UT7Mh+57
+qWb2q9CuI+unQcav1tqxRxUtrGHl0YSO5YTWCnaT7vVFUSbemwUhEHJs8h+Qw41L
+g4eBu/qXLQJBANdy7puiDBBvV8XxQms14VRAEUUpCwqmzieG3RNmgr7wYRKyXzws
+hbgp5HIkGFIM4FOIrFj5jUP6CuF2BfoYaZkCQGRIny75w6s413nfY/u/TBOqyW5V
+J/wYElSWW35bpxTLkNzVY5+F88ankUlvTUDIuKaZEobCmXW+bilTeRs6gUUCQGeo
+2Lzw3rUZnTWTus0yg1Ox751C/hkF4LKL5NpsvAN6THpecAvXsA7HuS5hx4HSyCvo
+2mOEzj8ikxGfY4jNLiECQE09wQ39Gw3oGKCzdsTcWy8PXIWjOS44+7N/GjUB52+o
+CK7BGBOdZGZUSFc1rVA7eWKzxFDZ+EK264z6DL95mRw=
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"""
+
     def handle_server_hello_done(self, server_hello_done):
         if server_hello_done[-4:] == self.server_hello_done_signature:
             self.server_hello_done_received = True
@@ -109,13 +122,20 @@
         self.pkt_history = []
         self.pkt_map = { self.SERVER_HELLO: ['', '', lambda pkt: pkt ],
                          self.SERVER_CERTIFICATE: ['', '', lambda pkt: pkt ],
+                         self.CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: ['', '', lambda pkt: pkt ],
                          self.SERVER_HELLO_DONE: ['', '', self.handle_server_hello_done ],
                          self.SERVER_UNKNOWN: ['', '', lambda pkt: pkt ]
                        }
         self.tls_ctx = TLSSessionCtx(client = True)
 
     def load_tls_record(self, data, pkt_type = ''):
-        if pkt_type not in [ self.SERVER_HELLO_DONE, self.SERVER_UNKNOWN ]:
+        #if pkt_type not in [ self.SERVER_HELLO_DONE, self.SERVER_UNKNOWN ]:
+        if pkt_type == self.SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
+            data = str(TLSRecord(content_type=TLSContentType.HANDSHAKE)/data)
+        elif pkt_type == self.CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
+            data = str(TLSRecord()/TLSHandshake(type=TLSHandshakeType.CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)/data[9:])
+            data = None #For now ignore this record
+        if data:
             TLS(data, ctx = self.tls_ctx)
 
     def pkt_update(self, pkt_type, data, hdr=None, reassembled = False):
@@ -139,6 +159,7 @@
         r = str(pkt)
         offset = self.TLS_OFFSET
         tls_data = r[offset:]
+        type_hdrlen = 0
         if self.pending_bytes > 0:
             if len(tls_data) >= self.pending_bytes:
                 self.pkt_update(self.pkt_last, tls_data[:self.pending_bytes], reassembled = True)
@@ -154,9 +175,13 @@
             self.pending_bytes = bytes_to_num(tls_data[3:5])
             if tls_data[0] == self.HANDSHAKE:
                 pkt_type = tls_data[5]
-                if len(tls_data) - 5 >= self.pending_bytes:
-                    data_received = tls_data[5: 5 + self.pending_bytes]
-                    offset += 5 + self.pending_bytes
+                if pkt_type in [ self.CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ]:
+                    self.pending_bytes = bytes_to_num(tls_data[6:9])
+                    type_hdrlen = 4
+                if len(tls_data) - 5 - type_hdrlen >= self.pending_bytes:
+                    data_received = tls_data[5: 5 + type_hdrlen + self.pending_bytes ]
+                    offset += 5 + type_hdrlen + self.pending_bytes
+                    type_hdrlen = 0
                     self.pending_bytes = 0
                     self.pkt_update(pkt_type, data_received,
                                     hdr = tls_data[:5],
@@ -165,10 +190,13 @@
                     self.pkt_update(pkt_type, tls_data[5:],
                                     hdr = tls_data[:5],
                                     reassembled = False)
-                    self.pending_bytes -= len(tls_data) - 5
+                    self.pending_bytes -= len(tls_data) - 5 - type_hdrlen
                     self.pkt_last = pkt_type
                     log.info('Pending bytes left %d' %(self.pending_bytes))
                     assert self.pending_bytes > 0
+            elif tls_data[0] == self.SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
+                self.pkt_update(tls_data[0], tls_data, reassembled = True)
+                break
             else:
                 self.pkt_last = self.SERVER_UNKNOWN
                 if len(tls_data) - 5 >= self.pending_bytes:
@@ -210,11 +238,12 @@
                                                    gmt_unix_time=1234,
                                                    random_bytes= '\xAB' * 28,
                                                    session_id='',
-                                                   compression_methods=(TLSCompressionMethod.NULL),
+                                                   compression_methods=[TLSCompressionMethod.NULL],
                                                    cipher_suites=[TLSCipherSuite.RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA]
                                                    )
-                self.pkt_history.append( str(self.client_hello) )
-                reqdata = TLSRecord()/TLSHandshake()/self.client_hello
+                client_hello_data = TLSHandshake()/self.client_hello
+                self.pkt_history.append( str(client_hello_data) )
+                reqdata = TLSRecord()/client_hello_data
                 self.load_tls_record(str(reqdata))
                 log.info("Sending Client Hello TLS payload of len %d, id %d" %(len(reqdata),pkt[EAP].id))
                 eap_payload = self.eapTLS(EAP_RESPONSE, pkt[EAP].id, TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED, str(reqdata))
@@ -231,15 +260,31 @@
         ##send cert request when we receive the last server hello fragment
         self.nextEvent = self.tlsEventTable.EVT_EAP_TLS_CERT_REQ
 
-    def get_encrypted_handshake_msg(self, finish_val=''):
+    def get_verify_data(self):
         all_handshake_pkts = ''.join(self.pkt_history)
+        return self.tls_ctx.get_verify_data(data = all_handshake_pkts)
+
+    def get_verify_signature(self, pem_data):
+        all_handshake_pkts = ''.join(self.pkt_history)
+        k = Key(pem_data)
+        signature = k.sign(all_handshake_pkts, t = 'pkcs', h = 'tls')
+        signature_data = '{}{}'.format(struct.pack('!H', len(signature)), signature)
+        return signature_data
+
+    def get_encrypted_handshake_msg(self, finish_val=''):
         if not finish_val:
-            finish_val = self.tls_ctx.get_verify_data(data = all_handshake_pkts)
+            finish_val = self.get_verify_data()
         msg = str(TLSHandshake(type=TLSHandshakeType.FINISHED)/finish_val)
         crypto_container = CryptoContainer(self.tls_ctx, data = msg,
                                            content_type = TLSContentType.HANDSHAKE)
         return crypto_container.encrypt()
 
+    def get_encrypted_application_msg(self, msg = ''):
+        '''Needed with tunneled TLS'''
+        if not msg:
+            msg = 'test data'
+        return to_raw(TLSPlaintext(data = 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHOST: localhost\r\n\r\n'), self.tls_ctx)
+
     def _eapTlsCertReq(self):
 
         def eapol_cb(pkt):
@@ -249,21 +294,28 @@
                 assert self.server_hello_done_received == True
                 rex_pem = re.compile(r'\-+BEGIN[^\-]+\-+(.*?)\-+END[^\-]+\-+', re.DOTALL)
                 der_cert = rex_pem.findall(self.CLIENT_CERT)[0].decode("base64")
-                client_certificate = TLSRecord(version="TLS_1_0")/TLSHandshake()/TLSCertificateList(
+                client_certificate_list = TLSHandshake()/TLSCertificateList(
                     certificates=[TLSCertificate(data=x509.X509Cert(der_cert))])
+                client_certificate = TLSRecord(version="TLS_1_0")/client_certificate_list
                 kex_data = self.tls_ctx.get_client_kex_data()
-                client_key_ex = TLSRecord()/TLSHandshake()/kex_data
-                client_key_ex_data = str(TLSHandshake()/kex_data)
-                self.pkt_history.append(client_key_ex_data)
+                client_key_ex_data = TLSHandshake()/kex_data
+                client_key_ex = TLSRecord()/client_key_ex_data
+                self.load_tls_record(str(client_certificate))
                 self.load_tls_record(str(client_key_ex))
+                self.pkt_history.append(str(client_certificate_list))
+                self.pkt_history.append(str(client_key_ex_data))
+                verify_signature = self.get_verify_signature(self.CLIENT_PRIV_KEY)
+                client_cert_verify = TLSHandshake(type=TLSHandshakeType.CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)/verify_signature
+                client_cert_record = TLSRecord(content_type=TLSContentType.HANDSHAKE)/client_cert_verify
+                self.pkt_history.append(str(client_cert_verify))
                 #log.info('TLS ctxt: %s' %self.tls_ctx)
                 client_ccs = TLSRecord(version="TLS_1_0")/TLSChangeCipherSpec()
                 enc_handshake_msg = self.get_encrypted_handshake_msg()
                 handshake_msg = str(TLSRecord(content_type=TLSContentType.HANDSHAKE)/enc_handshake_msg)
-                reqdata = str(TLS.from_records( [client_certificate, client_key_ex, client_ccs] ))
+                reqdata = str(TLS.from_records([client_certificate, client_key_ex, client_cert_record, client_ccs]))
                 reqdata += handshake_msg
                 log.info("------> Sending Client Hello TLS Certificate payload of len %d ----------->" %len(reqdata))
-                eap_payload = self.eapTLS(EAP_RESPONSE, pkt[EAP].id, TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED, str(reqdata))
+                eap_payload = self.eapTLS(EAP_RESPONSE, pkt[EAP].id, TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED, reqdata)
                 self.eapol_send(EAPOL_EAPPACKET, eap_payload)
 
         self.eapol_scapy_recv(cb = eapol_cb,
@@ -274,9 +326,12 @@
     def _eapTlsChangeCipherSpec(self):
         def eapol_cb(pkt):
             r = str(pkt)
-            tls_data = r[TLS_OFFSET:]
+            tls_data = r[self.TLS_OFFSET:]
             log.info('Verifying TLS Change Cipher spec record type %x' %ord(tls_data[0]))
             assert tls_data[0] == self.CHANGE_CIPHER
+            log.info('Handshake finished. Sending empty data')
+            eap_payload = self.eapTLS(EAP_RESPONSE, pkt[EAP].id, 0, '')
+            self.eapol_send(EAPOL_EAPPACKET, eap_payload)
 
         self.eapol_scapy_recv(cb = eapol_cb,
                               lfilter =
@@ -286,10 +341,10 @@
     def _eapTlsFinished(self):
 
         def eapol_cb(pkt):
-                log.info('Got Server finished')
+            log.info('Server authentication successfull')
 
         self.eapol_scapy_recv(cb = eapol_cb,
                               lfilter =
-                              lambda pkt: EAP in pkt and pkt[EAP].type == EAP_TYPE_TLS and pkt[EAP].code == EAP.REQUEST)
-        #We stop here as certification validation success implies auth success
+                              lambda pkt: EAP in pkt and pkt[EAP].code == EAP.SUCCESS)
+        self.eapol_logoff()
         self.nextEvent = None
diff --git a/src/test/utils/EapolAAA.py b/src/test/utils/EapolAAA.py
index 419c7e3..a897833 100644
--- a/src/test/utils/EapolAAA.py
+++ b/src/test/utils/EapolAAA.py
@@ -102,6 +102,10 @@
         eap_payload = self.eap(EAPOL_START, 2)
         return self.eapol_send(EAPOL_START, eap_payload)
 
+    def eapol_logoff(self):
+        eap_payload = self.eap(EAPOL_LOGOFF, 2)
+        return self.eapol_send(EAPOL_LOGOFF, eap_payload)
+
     def eapol_id_req(self, pkt_id = 0, user = USER):
         eap_payload = self.eap(EAP_RESPONSE, pkt_id, EAP_TYPE_ID, user)
         return self.eapol_send(EAPOL_EAPPACKET, eap_payload)
diff --git a/src/test/utils/tls_cert.py b/src/test/utils/tls_cert.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68726e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/utils/tls_cert.py
@@ -0,0 +1,1060 @@
+## This file is part of Scapy
+## See http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy for more informations
+## Copyright (C) Arnaud Ebalard <arno@natisbad.org>
+## This program is published under a GPLv2 license
+
+"""
+Cryptographic certificates.
+"""
+
+import os, sys, math, struct, random
+from scapy.utils import strxor
+from scapy_ssl_tls.ssl_tls_crypto import x509_extract_pubkey_from_der
+try:
+    HAS_HASHLIB=True
+    import hashlib
+except:
+    HAS_HASHLIB=False
+
+from Crypto.PublicKey import *
+from Crypto.Cipher import *
+from Crypto.Hash import *
+from Crypto.Util import number
+
+# Maximum allowed size in bytes for a certificate file, to avoid
+# loading huge file when importing a cert
+MAX_KEY_SIZE=50*1024
+
+#####################################################################
+# Some helpers
+#####################################################################
+
+def warning(m):
+    print "WARNING: %s" % m
+
+def randstring(l):
+    """
+    Returns a random string of length l (l >= 0)
+    """
+    tmp = map(lambda x: struct.pack("B", random.randrange(0, 256, 1)), [""]*l)
+    return "".join(tmp)
+
+def zerofree_randstring(l):
+    """
+    Returns a random string of length l (l >= 0) without zero in it.
+    """
+    tmp = map(lambda x: struct.pack("B", random.randrange(1, 256, 1)), [""]*l)
+    return "".join(tmp)
+
+def strand(s1, s2):
+    """
+    Returns the binary AND of the 2 provided strings s1 and s2. s1 and s2
+    must be of same length.
+    """
+    return "".join(map(lambda x,y:chr(ord(x)&ord(y)), s1, s2))
+
+# OS2IP function defined in RFC 3447 for octet string to integer conversion
+def pkcs_os2ip(x):
+    """
+    Accepts a byte string as input parameter and return the associated long
+    value:
+
+    Input : x        octet string to be converted
+
+    Output: x        corresponding nonnegative integer
+
+    Reverse function is pkcs_i2osp()
+    """
+    return number.bytes_to_long(x) 
+
+# IP2OS function defined in RFC 3447 for octet string to integer conversion
+def pkcs_i2osp(x,xLen):
+    """
+    Converts a long (the first parameter) to the associated byte string
+    representation of length l (second parameter). Basically, the length
+    parameters allow the function to perform the associated padding.
+
+    Input : x        nonnegative integer to be converted
+            xLen     intended length of the resulting octet string
+
+    Output: x        corresponding nonnegative integer
+
+    Reverse function is pkcs_os2ip().
+    """
+    z = number.long_to_bytes(x)
+    padlen = max(0, xLen-len(z))
+    return '\x00'*padlen + z
+
+# for every hash function a tuple is provided, giving access to
+# - hash output length in byte
+# - associated hash function that take data to be hashed as parameter
+#   XXX I do not provide update() at the moment.
+# - DER encoding of the leading bits of digestInfo (the hash value
+#   will be concatenated to create the complete digestInfo).
+#
+# Notes:
+# - MD4 asn.1 value should be verified. Also, as stated in
+#   PKCS#1 v2.1, MD4 should not be used.
+# - hashlib is available from http://code.krypto.org/python/hashlib/
+# - 'tls' one is the concatenation of both md5 and sha1 hashes used
+#   by SSL/TLS when signing/verifying things
+_hashFuncParams = {
+    "md2"    : (16, 
+                lambda x: MD2.new(x).digest(),
+                '\x30\x20\x30\x0c\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x02\x02\x05\x00\x04\x10'),
+    "md4"    : (16,
+                lambda x: MD4.new(x).digest(), 
+                '\x30\x20\x30\x0c\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x02\x04\x05\x00\x04\x10'), # is that right ?
+    "md5"    : (16, 
+                lambda x: MD5.new(x).digest(), 
+                '\x30\x20\x30\x0c\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x02\x05\x05\x00\x04\x10'),
+    "sha1"   : (20,
+                lambda x: SHA.new(x).digest(), 
+                '\x30\x21\x30\x09\x06\x05\x2b\x0e\x03\x02\x1a\x05\x00\x04\x14'),
+    "tls"    : (36,
+                lambda x: MD5.new(x).digest() + SHA.new(x).digest(),
+                '') }
+
+if HAS_HASHLIB:
+    _hashFuncParams["sha224"] = (28,
+                lambda x: hashlib.sha224(x).digest(),
+                '\x30\x2d\x30\x0d\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x04\x05\x00\x04\x1c')
+    _hashFuncParams["sha256"] = (32,
+                lambda x: hashlib.sha256(x).digest(),
+                '\x30\x31\x30\x0d\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x01\x05\x00\x04\x20')
+    _hashFuncParams["sha384"] = (48,
+                lambda x: hashlib.sha384(x).digest(),
+               '\x30\x41\x30\x0d\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x02\x05\x00\x04\x30')
+    _hashFuncParams["sha512"] = (64,
+               lambda x: hashlib.sha512(x).digest(),
+               '\x30\x51\x30\x0d\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x03\x05\x00\x04\x40')
+else:
+    warning("hashlib support is not available. Consider installing it")
+    warning("if you need sha224, sha256, sha384 and sha512 algs.")
+
+def pkcs_mgf1(mgfSeed, maskLen, h):
+    """
+    Implements generic MGF1 Mask Generation function as described in
+    Appendix B.2.1 of RFC 3447. The hash function is passed by name.
+    valid values are 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls, 'sha256',
+    'sha384' and 'sha512'. Returns None on error.
+
+    Input:
+       mgfSeed: seed from which mask is generated, an octet string
+       maskLen: intended length in octets of the mask, at most 2^32 * hLen
+                hLen (see below)
+       h      : hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls',
+                'sha256', 'sha384'). hLen denotes the length in octets of
+                the hash function output.
+
+    Output:
+       an octet string of length maskLen
+    """
+
+    # steps are those of Appendix B.2.1
+    if not _hashFuncParams.has_key(h):
+        warning("pkcs_mgf1: invalid hash (%s) provided")
+        return None
+    hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0]
+    hFunc = _hashFuncParams[h][1]
+    if maskLen > 2**32 * hLen:                               # 1)
+        warning("pkcs_mgf1: maskLen > 2**32 * hLen")
+        return None
+    T = ""                                                   # 2)
+    maxCounter = math.ceil(float(maskLen) / float(hLen))     # 3)
+    counter = 0
+    while counter < maxCounter:
+        C = pkcs_i2osp(counter, 4)
+        T += hFunc(mgfSeed + C)
+        counter += 1
+    return T[:maskLen]
+
+
+def pkcs_emsa_pss_encode(M, emBits, h, mgf, sLen):
+    """
+    Implements EMSA-PSS-ENCODE() function described in Sect. 9.1.1 of RFC 3447
+
+    Input:
+       M     : message to be encoded, an octet string
+       emBits: maximal bit length of the integer resulting of pkcs_os2ip(EM),
+               where EM is the encoded message, output of the function.
+       h     : hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls',
+               'sha256', 'sha384'). hLen denotes the length in octets of
+               the hash function output.
+       mgf   : the mask generation function f : seed, maskLen -> mask
+       sLen  : intended length in octets of the salt
+
+    Output:
+       encoded message, an octet string of length emLen = ceil(emBits/8)
+
+    On error, None is returned.
+    """
+
+    # 1) is not done
+    hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0]                             # 2)
+    hFunc = _hashFuncParams[h][1]
+    mHash = hFunc(M)
+    emLen = int(math.ceil(emBits/8.))
+    if emLen < hLen + sLen + 2:                              # 3)
+        warning("encoding error (emLen < hLen + sLen + 2)")
+        return None
+    salt = randstring(sLen)                                  # 4)
+    MPrime = '\x00'*8 + mHash + salt                         # 5)
+    H = hFunc(MPrime)                                        # 6)
+    PS = '\x00'*(emLen - sLen - hLen - 2)                    # 7)
+    DB = PS + '\x01' + salt                                  # 8)
+    dbMask = mgf(H, emLen - hLen - 1)                        # 9)
+    maskedDB = strxor(DB, dbMask)                            # 10)
+    l = (8*emLen - emBits)/8                                 # 11)
+    rem = 8*emLen - emBits - 8*l # additionnal bits
+    andMask = l*'\x00'
+    if rem:
+        j = chr(reduce(lambda x,y: x+y, map(lambda x: 1<<x, range(8-rem))))
+        andMask += j
+        l += 1
+    maskedDB = strand(maskedDB[:l], andMask) + maskedDB[l:]
+    EM = maskedDB + H + '\xbc'                               # 12)
+    return EM                                                # 13)
+
+
+def pkcs_emsa_pss_verify(M, EM, emBits, h, mgf, sLen):
+    """
+    Implements EMSA-PSS-VERIFY() function described in Sect. 9.1.2 of RFC 3447
+
+    Input:
+       M     : message to be encoded, an octet string
+       EM    : encoded message, an octet string of length emLen = ceil(emBits/8)
+       emBits: maximal bit length of the integer resulting of pkcs_os2ip(EM)
+       h     : hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls',
+               'sha256', 'sha384'). hLen denotes the length in octets of
+               the hash function output.
+       mgf   : the mask generation function f : seed, maskLen -> mask
+       sLen  : intended length in octets of the salt
+
+    Output:
+       True if the verification is ok, False otherwise.
+    """
+
+    # 1) is not done
+    hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0]                             # 2)
+    hFunc = _hashFuncParams[h][1]
+    mHash = hFunc(M)
+    emLen = int(math.ceil(emBits/8.))                        # 3)
+    if emLen < hLen + sLen + 2:
+        return False
+    if EM[-1] != '\xbc':                                     # 4)
+        return False
+    l = emLen - hLen - 1                                     # 5)
+    maskedDB = EM[:l]
+    H = EM[l:l+hLen]
+    l = (8*emLen - emBits)/8                                 # 6)
+    rem = 8*emLen - emBits - 8*l # additionnal bits
+    andMask = l*'\xff'
+    if rem:
+        val = reduce(lambda x,y: x+y, map(lambda x: 1<<x, range(8-rem)))
+        j = chr(~val & 0xff)
+        andMask += j
+        l += 1
+    if strand(maskedDB[:l], andMask) != '\x00'*l:
+        return False
+    dbMask = mgf(H, emLen - hLen - 1)                        # 7)
+    DB = strxor(maskedDB, dbMask)                            # 8)
+    l = (8*emLen - emBits)/8                                 # 9)
+    rem = 8*emLen - emBits - 8*l # additionnal bits
+    andMask = l*'\x00'
+    if rem:
+        j = chr(reduce(lambda x,y: x+y, map(lambda x: 1<<x, range(8-rem))))
+        andMask += j
+        l += 1
+    DB = strand(DB[:l], andMask) + DB[l:]
+    l = emLen - hLen - sLen - 1                              # 10)
+    if DB[:l] != '\x00'*(l-1) + '\x01':
+        return False
+    salt = DB[-sLen:]                                        # 11)
+    MPrime = '\x00'*8 + mHash + salt                         # 12)
+    HPrime = hFunc(MPrime)                                   # 13)
+    return H == HPrime                                       # 14)
+
+
+def pkcs_emsa_pkcs1_v1_5_encode(M, emLen, h): # section 9.2 of RFC 3447
+    """
+    Implements EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE() function described in Sect.
+    9.2 of RFC 3447.
+
+    Input:
+       M    : message to be encode, an octet string
+       emLen: intended length in octets of the encoded message, at least
+              tLen + 11, where tLen is the octet length of the DER encoding
+              T of a certain value computed during the encoding operation.
+       h    : hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls',
+              'sha256', 'sha384'). hLen denotes the length in octets of
+              the hash function output.
+
+    Output:
+       encoded message, an octet string of length emLen
+
+    On error, None is returned.
+    """
+    hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0]                             # 1)
+    hFunc = _hashFuncParams[h][1]
+    H = hFunc(M)
+    hLeadingDigestInfo = _hashFuncParams[h][2]               # 2)
+    T = hLeadingDigestInfo + H
+    tLen = len(T)
+    if emLen < tLen + 11:                                    # 3)
+        warning("pkcs_emsa_pkcs1_v1_5_encode: intended encoded message length too short")
+        return None
+    PS = '\xff'*(emLen - tLen - 3)                           # 4)
+    EM = '\x00' + '\x01' + PS + '\x00' + T                   # 5)
+    return EM                                                # 6)
+
+
+#####################################################################
+# Public Key Cryptography related stuff
+#####################################################################
+
+class _EncryptAndVerify:
+    ### Below are encryption methods
+
+    def _rsaep(self, m):
+        """
+        Internal method providing raw RSA encryption, i.e. simple modular
+        exponentiation of the given message representative 'm', a long
+        between 0 and n-1.
+
+        This is the encryption primitive RSAEP described in PKCS#1 v2.1,
+        i.e. RFC 3447 Sect. 5.1.1.
+
+        Input:
+           m: message representative, a long between 0 and n-1, where
+              n is the key modulus.
+
+        Output:
+           ciphertext representative, a long between 0 and n-1
+
+        Not intended to be used directly. Please, see encrypt() method.
+        """
+
+        n = self.modulus
+        if type(m) is int:
+            m = long(m)
+        if type(m) is not long or m > n-1:
+            warning("Key._rsaep() expects a long between 0 and n-1")
+            return None
+
+        return self.key.encrypt(m, "")[0]
+
+
+    def _rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_encrypt(self, M):
+        """
+        Implements RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT() function described in section
+        7.2.1 of RFC 3447.
+
+        Input:
+           M: message to be encrypted, an octet string of length mLen, where
+              mLen <= k - 11 (k denotes the length in octets of the key modulus)
+
+        Output:
+           ciphertext, an octet string of length k
+
+        On error, None is returned.
+        """
+
+        # 1) Length checking
+        mLen = len(M)
+        k = self.modulusLen / 8
+        if mLen > k - 11:
+            warning("Key._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_encrypt(): message too "
+                    "long (%d > %d - 11)" % (mLen, k))
+            return None
+
+        # 2) EME-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding
+        PS = zerofree_randstring(k - mLen - 3)      # 2.a)
+        EM = '\x00' + '\x02' + PS + '\x00' + M      # 2.b)
+
+        # 3) RSA encryption
+        m = pkcs_os2ip(EM)                          # 3.a)
+        c = self._rsaep(m)                          # 3.b)
+        C = pkcs_i2osp(c, k)                        # 3.c)
+
+        return C                                    # 4)
+
+
+    def _rsaes_oaep_encrypt(self, M, h=None, mgf=None, L=None):
+        """
+        Internal method providing RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT as defined in Sect.
+        7.1.1 of RFC 3447. Not intended to be used directly. Please, see
+        encrypt() method for type "OAEP".
+
+
+        Input:
+           M  : message to be encrypted, an octet string of length mLen
+                where mLen <= k - 2*hLen - 2 (k denotes the length in octets
+                of the RSA modulus and hLen the length in octets of the hash
+                function output)
+           h  : hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls',
+                'sha256', 'sha384'). hLen denotes the length in octets of
+                the hash function output. 'sha1' is used by default if not
+                provided.
+           mgf: the mask generation function f : seed, maskLen -> mask
+           L  : optional label to be associated with the message; the default
+                value for L, if not provided is the empty string
+
+        Output:
+           ciphertext, an octet string of length k
+
+        On error, None is returned.
+        """
+        # The steps below are the one described in Sect. 7.1.1 of RFC 3447.
+        # 1) Length Checking
+                                                    # 1.a) is not done
+        mLen = len(M)
+        if h is None:
+            h = "sha1"
+        if not _hashFuncParams.has_key(h):
+            warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_encrypt(): unknown hash function %s.", h)
+            return None
+        hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0]
+        hFun = _hashFuncParams[h][1]
+        k = self.modulusLen / 8
+        if mLen > k - 2*hLen - 2:                   # 1.b)
+            warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_encrypt(): message too long.")
+            return None
+
+        # 2) EME-OAEP encoding
+        if L is None:                               # 2.a)
+            L = ""
+        lHash = hFun(L)
+        PS = '\x00'*(k - mLen - 2*hLen - 2)         # 2.b)
+        DB = lHash + PS + '\x01' + M                # 2.c)
+        seed = randstring(hLen)                     # 2.d)
+        if mgf is None:                             # 2.e)
+            mgf = lambda x,y: pkcs_mgf1(x,y,h)
+        dbMask = mgf(seed, k - hLen - 1)
+        maskedDB = strxor(DB, dbMask)               # 2.f)
+        seedMask = mgf(maskedDB, hLen)              # 2.g)
+        maskedSeed = strxor(seed, seedMask)         # 2.h)
+        EM = '\x00' + maskedSeed + maskedDB         # 2.i)
+
+        # 3) RSA Encryption
+        m = pkcs_os2ip(EM)                          # 3.a)
+        c = self._rsaep(m)                          # 3.b)
+        C = pkcs_i2osp(c, k)                        # 3.c)
+
+        return C                                    # 4)
+
+
+    def encrypt(self, m, t=None, h=None, mgf=None, L=None):
+        """
+        Encrypt message 'm' using 't' encryption scheme where 't' can be:
+
+        - None: the message 'm' is directly applied the RSAEP encryption
+                primitive, as described in PKCS#1 v2.1, i.e. RFC 3447
+                Sect 5.1.1. Simply put, the message undergo a modular
+                exponentiation using the public key. Additionnal method
+                parameters are just ignored.
+
+        - 'pkcs': the message 'm' is applied RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT encryption
+                scheme as described in section 7.2.1 of RFC 3447. In that
+                context, other parameters ('h', 'mgf', 'l') are not used.
+
+        - 'oaep': the message 'm' is applied the RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT encryption
+                scheme, as described in PKCS#1 v2.1, i.e. RFC 3447 Sect
+                7.1.1. In that context,
+
+                o 'h' parameter provides the name of the hash method to use.
+                  Possible values are "md2", "md4", "md5", "sha1", "tls",
+                  "sha224", "sha256", "sha384" and "sha512". if none is provided,
+                  sha1 is used.
+
+                o 'mgf' is the mask generation function. By default, mgf
+                  is derived from the provided hash function using the
+                  generic MGF1 (see pkcs_mgf1() for details).
+
+                o 'L' is the optional label to be associated with the
+                  message. If not provided, the default value is used, i.e
+                  the empty string. No check is done on the input limitation
+                  of the hash function regarding the size of 'L' (for
+                  instance, 2^61 - 1 for SHA-1). You have been warned.
+        """
+
+        if t is None: # Raw encryption
+            m = pkcs_os2ip(m)
+            c = self._rsaep(m)
+            return pkcs_i2osp(c, self.modulusLen/8)
+
+        elif t == "pkcs":
+            return self._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_encrypt(m)
+
+        elif t == "oaep":
+            return self._rsaes_oaep_encrypt(m, h, mgf, L)
+
+        else:
+            warning("Key.encrypt(): Unknown encryption type (%s) provided" % t)
+            return None
+
+    ### Below are verification related methods
+
+    def _rsavp1(self, s):
+        """
+        Internal method providing raw RSA verification, i.e. simple modular
+        exponentiation of the given signature representative 'c', an integer
+        between 0 and n-1.
+
+        This is the signature verification primitive RSAVP1 described in
+        PKCS#1 v2.1, i.e. RFC 3447 Sect. 5.2.2.
+
+        Input:
+          s: signature representative, an integer between 0 and n-1,
+             where n is the key modulus.
+
+        Output:
+           message representative, an integer between 0 and n-1
+
+        Not intended to be used directly. Please, see verify() method.
+        """
+        return self._rsaep(s)
+
+    def _rsassa_pss_verify(self, M, S, h=None, mgf=None, sLen=None):
+        """
+        Implements RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY() function described in Sect 8.1.2
+        of RFC 3447
+
+        Input:
+           M: message whose signature is to be verified
+           S: signature to be verified, an octet string of length k, where k
+              is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n.
+
+        Output:
+           True is the signature is valid. False otherwise.
+        """
+
+        # Set default parameters if not provided
+        if h is None: # By default, sha1
+            h = "sha1"
+        if not _hashFuncParams.has_key(h):
+            warning("Key._rsassa_pss_verify(): unknown hash function "
+                    "provided (%s)" % h)
+            return False
+        if mgf is None: # use mgf1 with underlying hash function
+            mgf = lambda x,y: pkcs_mgf1(x, y, h)
+        if sLen is None: # use Hash output length (A.2.3 of RFC 3447)
+            hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0]
+            sLen = hLen
+
+        # 1) Length checking
+        modBits = self.modulusLen
+        k = modBits / 8
+        if len(S) != k:
+            return False
+
+        # 2) RSA verification
+        s = pkcs_os2ip(S)                           # 2.a)
+        m = self._rsavp1(s)                         # 2.b)
+        emLen = math.ceil((modBits - 1) / 8.)       # 2.c)
+        EM = pkcs_i2osp(m, emLen)
+
+        # 3) EMSA-PSS verification
+        Result = pkcs_emsa_pss_verify(M, EM, modBits - 1, h, mgf, sLen)
+
+        return Result                               # 4)
+
+
+    def _rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_verify(self, M, S, h):
+        """
+        Implements RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY() function as described in
+        Sect. 8.2.2 of RFC 3447.
+
+        Input:
+           M: message whose signature is to be verified, an octet string
+           S: signature to be verified, an octet string of length k, where
+              k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n
+           h: hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls',
+                'sha256', 'sha384').
+
+        Output:
+           True if the signature is valid. False otherwise.
+        """
+
+        # 1) Length checking
+        k = self.modulusLen / 8
+        if len(S) != k:
+            warning("invalid signature (len(S) != k)")
+            return False
+
+        # 2) RSA verification
+        s = pkcs_os2ip(S)                           # 2.a)
+        m = self._rsavp1(s)                         # 2.b)
+        EM = pkcs_i2osp(m, k)                       # 2.c)
+
+        # 3) EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding
+        EMPrime = pkcs_emsa_pkcs1_v1_5_encode(M, k, h)
+        if EMPrime is None:
+            warning("Key._rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_verify(): unable to encode.")
+            return False
+
+        # 4) Comparison
+        return EM == EMPrime
+
+
+    def verify(self, M, S, t=None, h=None, mgf=None, sLen=None):
+        """
+        Verify alleged signature 'S' is indeed the signature of message 'M' using
+        't' signature scheme where 't' can be:
+
+        - None: the alleged signature 'S' is directly applied the RSAVP1 signature
+                primitive, as described in PKCS#1 v2.1, i.e. RFC 3447 Sect
+                5.2.1. Simply put, the provided signature is applied a moular
+                exponentiation using the public key. Then, a comparison of the
+                result is done against 'M'. On match, True is returned.
+                Additionnal method parameters are just ignored.
+
+        - 'pkcs': the alleged signature 'S' and message 'M' are applied
+                RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY signature verification scheme as
+                described in Sect. 8.2.2 of RFC 3447. In that context,
+                the hash function name is passed using 'h'. Possible values are
+                "md2", "md4", "md5", "sha1", "tls", "sha224", "sha256", "sha384"
+                and "sha512". If none is provided, sha1 is used. Other additionnal
+                parameters are ignored.
+
+        - 'pss': the alleged signature 'S' and message 'M' are applied
+                RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY signature scheme as described in Sect. 8.1.2.
+                of RFC 3447. In that context,
+
+                o 'h' parameter provides the name of the hash method to use.
+                   Possible values are "md2", "md4", "md5", "sha1", "tls", "sha224",
+                   "sha256", "sha384" and "sha512". if none is provided, sha1
+                   is used.
+
+                o 'mgf' is the mask generation function. By default, mgf
+                   is derived from the provided hash function using the
+                   generic MGF1 (see pkcs_mgf1() for details).
+
+                o 'sLen' is the length in octet of the salt. You can overload the
+                  default value (the octet length of the hash value for provided
+                  algorithm) by providing another one with that parameter.
+        """
+        if t is None: # RSAVP1
+            S = pkcs_os2ip(S)
+            n = self.modulus
+            if S > n-1:
+                warning("Signature to be verified is too long for key modulus")
+                return False
+            m = self._rsavp1(S)
+            if m is None:
+                return False
+            l = int(math.ceil(math.log(m, 2) / 8.)) # Hack
+            m = pkcs_i2osp(m, l)
+            return M == m
+
+        elif t == "pkcs": # RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY
+            if h is None:
+                h = "sha1"
+            return self._rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_verify(M, S, h)
+
+        elif t == "pss": # RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY
+            return self._rsassa_pss_verify(M, S, h, mgf, sLen)
+
+        else:
+            warning("Key.verify(): Unknown signature type (%s) provided" % t)
+            return None
+
+class _DecryptAndSignMethods:
+    ### Below are decryption related methods. Encryption ones are inherited
+    ### from PubKey
+
+    def _rsadp(self, c):
+        """
+        Internal method providing raw RSA decryption, i.e. simple modular
+        exponentiation of the given ciphertext representative 'c', a long
+        between 0 and n-1.
+
+        This is the decryption primitive RSADP described in PKCS#1 v2.1,
+        i.e. RFC 3447 Sect. 5.1.2.
+
+        Input:
+           c: ciphertest representative, a long between 0 and n-1, where
+              n is the key modulus.
+
+        Output:
+           ciphertext representative, a long between 0 and n-1
+
+        Not intended to be used directly. Please, see encrypt() method.
+        """
+
+        n = self.modulus
+        if type(c) is int:
+            c = long(c)
+        if type(c) is not long or c > n-1:
+            warning("Key._rsaep() expects a long between 0 and n-1")
+            return None
+
+        return self.key.decrypt(c)
+
+
+    def _rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_decrypt(self, C):
+        """
+        Implements RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT() function described in section
+        7.2.2 of RFC 3447.
+
+        Input:
+           C: ciphertext to be decrypted, an octet string of length k, where
+              k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n.
+
+        Output:
+           an octet string of length k at most k - 11
+
+        on error, None is returned.
+        """
+
+        # 1) Length checking
+        cLen = len(C)
+        k = self.modulusLen / 8
+        if cLen != k or k < 11:
+            warning("Key._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_decrypt() decryption error "
+                    "(cLen != k or k < 11)")
+            return None
+
+        # 2) RSA decryption
+        c = pkcs_os2ip(C)                           # 2.a)
+        m = self._rsadp(c)                          # 2.b)
+        EM = pkcs_i2osp(m, k)                       # 2.c)
+
+        # 3) EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding
+
+        # I am aware of the note at the end of 7.2.2 regarding error
+        # conditions reporting but the one provided below are for _local_
+        # debugging purposes. --arno
+
+        if EM[0] != '\x00':
+            warning("Key._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_decrypt(): decryption error "
+                    "(first byte is not 0x00)")
+            return None
+
+        if EM[1] != '\x02':
+            warning("Key._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_decrypt(): decryption error "
+                    "(second byte is not 0x02)")
+            return None
+
+        tmp = EM[2:].split('\x00', 1)
+        if len(tmp) != 2:
+            warning("Key._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_decrypt(): decryption error "
+                    "(no 0x00 to separate PS from M)")
+            return None
+
+        PS, M = tmp
+        if len(PS) < 8:
+            warning("Key._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_decrypt(): decryption error "
+                    "(PS is less than 8 byte long)")
+            return None
+
+        return M                                    # 4)
+
+
+    def _rsaes_oaep_decrypt(self, C, h=None, mgf=None, L=None):
+        """
+        Internal method providing RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT as defined in Sect.
+        7.1.2 of RFC 3447. Not intended to be used directly. Please, see
+        encrypt() method for type "OAEP".
+
+
+        Input:
+           C  : ciphertext to be decrypted, an octet string of length k, where
+                k = 2*hLen + 2 (k denotes the length in octets of the RSA modulus
+                and hLen the length in octets of the hash function output)
+           h  : hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls',
+                'sha256', 'sha384'). 'sha1' is used if none is provided.
+           mgf: the mask generation function f : seed, maskLen -> mask
+           L  : optional label whose association with the message is to be
+                verified; the default value for L, if not provided is the empty
+                string.
+
+        Output:
+           message, an octet string of length k mLen, where mLen <= k - 2*hLen - 2
+
+        On error, None is returned.
+        """
+        # The steps below are the one described in Sect. 7.1.2 of RFC 3447.
+
+        # 1) Length Checking
+                                                    # 1.a) is not done
+        if h is None:
+            h = "sha1"
+        if not _hashFuncParams.has_key(h):
+            warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(): unknown hash function %s.", h)
+            return None
+        hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0]
+        hFun = _hashFuncParams[h][1]
+        k = self.modulusLen / 8
+        cLen = len(C)
+        if cLen != k:                               # 1.b)
+            warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(): decryption error. "
+                    "(cLen != k)")
+            return None
+        if k < 2*hLen + 2:
+            warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(): decryption error. "
+                    "(k < 2*hLen + 2)")
+            return None
+
+        # 2) RSA decryption
+        c = pkcs_os2ip(C)                           # 2.a)
+        m = self._rsadp(c)                          # 2.b)
+        EM = pkcs_i2osp(m, k)                       # 2.c)
+
+        # 3) EME-OAEP decoding
+        if L is None:                               # 3.a)
+            L = ""
+        lHash = hFun(L)
+        Y = EM[:1]                                  # 3.b)
+        if Y != '\x00':
+            warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(): decryption error. "
+                    "(Y is not zero)")
+            return None
+        maskedSeed = EM[1:1+hLen]
+        maskedDB = EM[1+hLen:]
+        if mgf is None:
+            mgf = lambda x,y: pkcs_mgf1(x, y, h)
+        seedMask = mgf(maskedDB, hLen)              # 3.c)
+        seed = strxor(maskedSeed, seedMask)         # 3.d)
+        dbMask = mgf(seed, k - hLen - 1)            # 3.e)
+        DB = strxor(maskedDB, dbMask)               # 3.f)
+
+        # I am aware of the note at the end of 7.1.2 regarding error
+        # conditions reporting but the one provided below are for _local_
+        # debugging purposes. --arno
+
+        lHashPrime = DB[:hLen]                      # 3.g)
+        tmp = DB[hLen:].split('\x01', 1)
+        if len(tmp) != 2:
+            warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(): decryption error. "
+                    "(0x01 separator not found)")
+            return None
+        PS, M = tmp
+        if PS != '\x00'*len(PS):
+            warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(): decryption error. "
+                    "(invalid padding string)")
+            return None
+        if lHash != lHashPrime:
+            warning("Key._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(): decryption error. "
+                    "(invalid hash)")
+            return None
+        return M                                    # 4)
+
+
+    def decrypt(self, C, t=None, h=None, mgf=None, L=None):
+        """
+        Decrypt ciphertext 'C' using 't' decryption scheme where 't' can be:
+
+        - None: the ciphertext 'C' is directly applied the RSADP decryption
+                primitive, as described in PKCS#1 v2.1, i.e. RFC 3447
+                Sect 5.1.2. Simply, put the message undergo a modular
+                exponentiation using the private key. Additionnal method
+                parameters are just ignored.
+
+        - 'pkcs': the ciphertext 'C' is applied RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT
+                decryption scheme as described in section 7.2.2 of RFC 3447.
+                In that context, other parameters ('h', 'mgf', 'l') are not
+                used.
+
+        - 'oaep': the ciphertext 'C' is applied the RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT decryption
+                scheme, as described in PKCS#1 v2.1, i.e. RFC 3447 Sect
+                7.1.2. In that context,
+
+                o 'h' parameter provides the name of the hash method to use.
+                  Possible values are "md2", "md4", "md5", "sha1", "tls",
+                  "sha224", "sha256", "sha384" and "sha512". if none is provided,
+                  sha1 is used by default.
+
+                o 'mgf' is the mask generation function. By default, mgf
+                  is derived from the provided hash function using the
+                  generic MGF1 (see pkcs_mgf1() for details).
+
+                o 'L' is the optional label to be associated with the
+                  message. If not provided, the default value is used, i.e
+                  the empty string. No check is done on the input limitation
+                  of the hash function regarding the size of 'L' (for
+                  instance, 2^61 - 1 for SHA-1). You have been warned.
+        """
+        if t is None:
+            C = pkcs_os2ip(C)
+            c = self._rsadp(C)
+            l = int(math.ceil(math.log(c, 2) / 8.)) # Hack
+            return pkcs_i2osp(c, l)
+
+        elif t == "pkcs":
+            return self._rsaes_pkcs1_v1_5_decrypt(C)
+
+        elif t == "oaep":
+            return self._rsaes_oaep_decrypt(C, h, mgf, L)
+
+        else:
+            warning("Key.decrypt(): Unknown decryption type (%s) provided" % t)
+            return None
+
+    ### Below are signature related methods. Verification ones are inherited from
+    ### PubKey
+
+    def _rsasp1(self, m):
+        """
+        Internal method providing raw RSA signature, i.e. simple modular
+        exponentiation of the given message representative 'm', an integer
+        between 0 and n-1.
+
+        This is the signature primitive RSASP1 described in PKCS#1 v2.1,
+        i.e. RFC 3447 Sect. 5.2.1.
+
+        Input:
+           m: message representative, an integer between 0 and n-1, where
+              n is the key modulus.
+
+        Output:
+           signature representative, an integer between 0 and n-1
+
+        Not intended to be used directly. Please, see sign() method.
+        """
+        return self._rsadp(m)
+
+
+    def _rsassa_pss_sign(self, M, h=None, mgf=None, sLen=None):
+        """
+        Implements RSASSA-PSS-SIGN() function described in Sect. 8.1.1 of
+        RFC 3447.
+
+        Input:
+           M: message to be signed, an octet string
+
+        Output:
+           signature, an octet string of length k, where k is the length in
+           octets of the RSA modulus n.
+
+        On error, None is returned.
+        """
+
+        # Set default parameters if not provided
+        if h is None: # By default, sha1
+            h = "sha1"
+        if not _hashFuncParams.has_key(h):
+            warning("Key._rsassa_pss_sign(): unknown hash function "
+                    "provided (%s)" % h)
+            return None
+        if mgf is None: # use mgf1 with underlying hash function
+            mgf = lambda x,y: pkcs_mgf1(x, y, h)
+        if sLen is None: # use Hash output length (A.2.3 of RFC 3447)
+            hLen = _hashFuncParams[h][0]
+            sLen = hLen
+
+        # 1) EMSA-PSS encoding
+        modBits = self.modulusLen
+        k = modBits / 8
+        EM = pkcs_emsa_pss_encode(M, modBits - 1, h, mgf, sLen)
+        if EM is None:
+            warning("Key._rsassa_pss_sign(): unable to encode")
+            return None
+
+        # 2) RSA signature
+        m = pkcs_os2ip(EM)                          # 2.a)
+        s = self._rsasp1(m)                         # 2.b)
+        S = pkcs_i2osp(s, k)                        # 2.c)
+
+        return S                                    # 3)
+
+
+    def _rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_sign(self, M, h):
+        """
+        Implements RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN() function as described in
+        Sect. 8.2.1 of RFC 3447.
+
+        Input:
+           M: message to be signed, an octet string
+           h: hash function name (in 'md2', 'md4', 'md5', 'sha1', 'tls'
+                'sha256', 'sha384').
+
+        Output:
+           the signature, an octet string.
+        """
+
+        # 1) EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding
+        k = self.modulusLen / 8
+        EM = pkcs_emsa_pkcs1_v1_5_encode(M, k, h)
+        if EM is None:
+            warning("Key._rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_sign(): unable to encode")
+            return None
+
+        # 2) RSA signature
+        m = pkcs_os2ip(EM)                          # 2.a)
+        s = self._rsasp1(m)                         # 2.b)
+        S = pkcs_i2osp(s, k)                        # 2.c)
+
+        return S                                    # 3)
+
+
+    def sign(self, M, t=None, h=None, mgf=None, sLen=None):
+        """
+        Sign message 'M' using 't' signature scheme where 't' can be:
+
+        - None: the message 'M' is directly applied the RSASP1 signature
+                primitive, as described in PKCS#1 v2.1, i.e. RFC 3447 Sect
+                5.2.1. Simply put, the message undergo a modular exponentiation
+                using the private key. Additionnal method parameters are just
+                ignored.
+
+        - 'pkcs': the message 'M' is applied RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN signature
+                scheme as described in Sect. 8.2.1 of RFC 3447. In that context,
+                the hash function name is passed using 'h'. Possible values are
+                "md2", "md4", "md5", "sha1", "tls", "sha224", "sha256", "sha384"
+                and "sha512". If none is provided, sha1 is used. Other additionnal
+                parameters are ignored.
+
+        - 'pss' : the message 'M' is applied RSASSA-PSS-SIGN signature scheme as
+                described in Sect. 8.1.1. of RFC 3447. In that context,
+
+                o 'h' parameter provides the name of the hash method to use.
+                   Possible values are "md2", "md4", "md5", "sha1", "tls", "sha224",
+                   "sha256", "sha384" and "sha512". if none is provided, sha1
+                   is used.
+
+                o 'mgf' is the mask generation function. By default, mgf
+                   is derived from the provided hash function using the
+                   generic MGF1 (see pkcs_mgf1() for details).
+
+                o 'sLen' is the length in octet of the salt. You can overload the
+                  default value (the octet length of the hash value for provided
+                  algorithm) by providing another one with that parameter.
+        """
+
+        if t is None: # RSASP1
+            M = pkcs_os2ip(M)
+            n = self.modulus
+            if M > n-1:
+                warning("Message to be signed is too long for key modulus")
+                return None
+            s = self._rsasp1(M)
+            if s is None:
+                return None
+            return pkcs_i2osp(s, self.modulusLen/8)
+
+        elif t == "pkcs": # RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN
+            if h is None:
+                h = "sha1"
+            return self._rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_sign(M, h)
+
+        elif t == "pss": # RSASSA-PSS-SIGN
+            return self._rsassa_pss_sign(M, h, mgf, sLen)
+
+        else:
+            warning("Key.sign(): Unknown signature type (%s) provided" % t)
+            return None
+
+class Key(_DecryptAndSignMethods, _EncryptAndVerify):
+
+    def __init__(self, pem_data):
+        self.key = RSA.importKey(pem_data)
+        self.modulus = self.key.key.n
+        self.modulusLen = self.key.key.size() + 1
+        self.privExp = self.key.key.d
+        self.pubExp = self.key.key.e
+        self.prime1 = self.key.key.p
+        self.prime2 = self.key.key.q
+        self.exponent1 = 0
+        self.exponent2 = 0
+        self.coefficient = self.key.key.u