Dependencies for the affinity router and the
affinity routing daemon.
Change-Id: Icda72c3594ef7f8f0bc0c33dc03087a4c25529ca
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/doc.go b/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/doc.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72741a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/doc.go
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The etcd Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+// Package auth provides client role authentication for accessing keys in etcd.
+package auth
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/jwt.go b/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/jwt.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99b2d6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/jwt.go
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+// Copyright 2017 The etcd Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package auth
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "crypto/rsa"
+ "io/ioutil"
+
+ jwt "github.com/dgrijalva/jwt-go"
+)
+
+type tokenJWT struct {
+ signMethod string
+ signKey *rsa.PrivateKey
+ verifyKey *rsa.PublicKey
+}
+
+func (t *tokenJWT) enable() {}
+func (t *tokenJWT) disable() {}
+func (t *tokenJWT) invalidateUser(string) {}
+func (t *tokenJWT) genTokenPrefix() (string, error) { return "", nil }
+
+func (t *tokenJWT) info(ctx context.Context, token string, rev uint64) (*AuthInfo, bool) {
+ // rev isn't used in JWT, it is only used in simple token
+ var (
+ username string
+ revision uint64
+ )
+
+ parsed, err := jwt.Parse(token, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
+ return t.verifyKey, nil
+ })
+
+ switch err.(type) {
+ case nil:
+ if !parsed.Valid {
+ plog.Warningf("invalid jwt token: %s", token)
+ return nil, false
+ }
+
+ claims := parsed.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
+
+ username = claims["username"].(string)
+ revision = uint64(claims["revision"].(float64))
+ default:
+ plog.Warningf("failed to parse jwt token: %s", err)
+ return nil, false
+ }
+
+ return &AuthInfo{Username: username, Revision: revision}, true
+}
+
+func (t *tokenJWT) assign(ctx context.Context, username string, revision uint64) (string, error) {
+ // Future work: let a jwt token include permission information would be useful for
+ // permission checking in proxy side.
+ tk := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.GetSigningMethod(t.signMethod),
+ jwt.MapClaims{
+ "username": username,
+ "revision": revision,
+ })
+
+ token, err := tk.SignedString(t.signKey)
+ if err != nil {
+ plog.Debugf("failed to sign jwt token: %s", err)
+ return "", err
+ }
+
+ plog.Debugf("jwt token: %s", token)
+
+ return token, err
+}
+
+func prepareOpts(opts map[string]string) (jwtSignMethod, jwtPubKeyPath, jwtPrivKeyPath string, err error) {
+ for k, v := range opts {
+ switch k {
+ case "sign-method":
+ jwtSignMethod = v
+ case "pub-key":
+ jwtPubKeyPath = v
+ case "priv-key":
+ jwtPrivKeyPath = v
+ default:
+ plog.Errorf("unknown token specific option: %s", k)
+ return "", "", "", ErrInvalidAuthOpts
+ }
+ }
+ if len(jwtSignMethod) == 0 {
+ return "", "", "", ErrInvalidAuthOpts
+ }
+ return jwtSignMethod, jwtPubKeyPath, jwtPrivKeyPath, nil
+}
+
+func newTokenProviderJWT(opts map[string]string) (*tokenJWT, error) {
+ jwtSignMethod, jwtPubKeyPath, jwtPrivKeyPath, err := prepareOpts(opts)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, ErrInvalidAuthOpts
+ }
+
+ t := &tokenJWT{}
+
+ t.signMethod = jwtSignMethod
+
+ verifyBytes, err := ioutil.ReadFile(jwtPubKeyPath)
+ if err != nil {
+ plog.Errorf("failed to read public key (%s) for jwt: %s", jwtPubKeyPath, err)
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ t.verifyKey, err = jwt.ParseRSAPublicKeyFromPEM(verifyBytes)
+ if err != nil {
+ plog.Errorf("failed to parse public key (%s): %s", jwtPubKeyPath, err)
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ signBytes, err := ioutil.ReadFile(jwtPrivKeyPath)
+ if err != nil {
+ plog.Errorf("failed to read private key (%s) for jwt: %s", jwtPrivKeyPath, err)
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ t.signKey, err = jwt.ParseRSAPrivateKeyFromPEM(signBytes)
+ if err != nil {
+ plog.Errorf("failed to parse private key (%s): %s", jwtPrivKeyPath, err)
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ return t, nil
+}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/nop.go b/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/nop.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d437874
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/nop.go
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The etcd Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package auth
+
+import (
+ "context"
+)
+
+type tokenNop struct{}
+
+func (t *tokenNop) enable() {}
+func (t *tokenNop) disable() {}
+func (t *tokenNop) invalidateUser(string) {}
+func (t *tokenNop) genTokenPrefix() (string, error) { return "", nil }
+func (t *tokenNop) info(ctx context.Context, token string, rev uint64) (*AuthInfo, bool) {
+ return nil, false
+}
+func (t *tokenNop) assign(ctx context.Context, username string, revision uint64) (string, error) {
+ return "", ErrAuthFailed
+}
+func newTokenProviderNop() (*tokenNop, error) {
+ return &tokenNop{}, nil
+}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/range_perm_cache.go b/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/range_perm_cache.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..691b65b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/range_perm_cache.go
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The etcd Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package auth
+
+import (
+ "github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/authpb"
+ "github.com/coreos/etcd/mvcc/backend"
+ "github.com/coreos/etcd/pkg/adt"
+)
+
+func getMergedPerms(tx backend.BatchTx, userName string) *unifiedRangePermissions {
+ user := getUser(tx, userName)
+ if user == nil {
+ plog.Errorf("invalid user name %s", userName)
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ readPerms := &adt.IntervalTree{}
+ writePerms := &adt.IntervalTree{}
+
+ for _, roleName := range user.Roles {
+ role := getRole(tx, roleName)
+ if role == nil {
+ continue
+ }
+
+ for _, perm := range role.KeyPermission {
+ var ivl adt.Interval
+ var rangeEnd []byte
+
+ if len(perm.RangeEnd) != 1 || perm.RangeEnd[0] != 0 {
+ rangeEnd = perm.RangeEnd
+ }
+
+ if len(perm.RangeEnd) != 0 {
+ ivl = adt.NewBytesAffineInterval(perm.Key, rangeEnd)
+ } else {
+ ivl = adt.NewBytesAffinePoint(perm.Key)
+ }
+
+ switch perm.PermType {
+ case authpb.READWRITE:
+ readPerms.Insert(ivl, struct{}{})
+ writePerms.Insert(ivl, struct{}{})
+
+ case authpb.READ:
+ readPerms.Insert(ivl, struct{}{})
+
+ case authpb.WRITE:
+ writePerms.Insert(ivl, struct{}{})
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return &unifiedRangePermissions{
+ readPerms: readPerms,
+ writePerms: writePerms,
+ }
+}
+
+func checkKeyInterval(cachedPerms *unifiedRangePermissions, key, rangeEnd []byte, permtyp authpb.Permission_Type) bool {
+ if len(rangeEnd) == 1 && rangeEnd[0] == 0 {
+ rangeEnd = nil
+ }
+
+ ivl := adt.NewBytesAffineInterval(key, rangeEnd)
+ switch permtyp {
+ case authpb.READ:
+ return cachedPerms.readPerms.Contains(ivl)
+ case authpb.WRITE:
+ return cachedPerms.writePerms.Contains(ivl)
+ default:
+ plog.Panicf("unknown auth type: %v", permtyp)
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+func checkKeyPoint(cachedPerms *unifiedRangePermissions, key []byte, permtyp authpb.Permission_Type) bool {
+ pt := adt.NewBytesAffinePoint(key)
+ switch permtyp {
+ case authpb.READ:
+ return cachedPerms.readPerms.Intersects(pt)
+ case authpb.WRITE:
+ return cachedPerms.writePerms.Intersects(pt)
+ default:
+ plog.Panicf("unknown auth type: %v", permtyp)
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) isRangeOpPermitted(tx backend.BatchTx, userName string, key, rangeEnd []byte, permtyp authpb.Permission_Type) bool {
+ // assumption: tx is Lock()ed
+ _, ok := as.rangePermCache[userName]
+ if !ok {
+ perms := getMergedPerms(tx, userName)
+ if perms == nil {
+ plog.Errorf("failed to create a unified permission of user %s", userName)
+ return false
+ }
+ as.rangePermCache[userName] = perms
+ }
+
+ if len(rangeEnd) == 0 {
+ return checkKeyPoint(as.rangePermCache[userName], key, permtyp)
+ }
+
+ return checkKeyInterval(as.rangePermCache[userName], key, rangeEnd, permtyp)
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) clearCachedPerm() {
+ as.rangePermCache = make(map[string]*unifiedRangePermissions)
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) invalidateCachedPerm(userName string) {
+ delete(as.rangePermCache, userName)
+}
+
+type unifiedRangePermissions struct {
+ readPerms *adt.IntervalTree
+ writePerms *adt.IntervalTree
+}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/simple_token.go b/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/simple_token.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac55ad7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/simple_token.go
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The etcd Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package auth
+
+// CAUTION: This randum number based token mechanism is only for testing purpose.
+// JWT based mechanism will be added in the near future.
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "crypto/rand"
+ "fmt"
+ "math/big"
+ "strconv"
+ "strings"
+ "sync"
+ "time"
+)
+
+const (
+ letters = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
+ defaultSimpleTokenLength = 16
+)
+
+// var for testing purposes
+var (
+ simpleTokenTTL = 5 * time.Minute
+ simpleTokenTTLResolution = 1 * time.Second
+)
+
+type simpleTokenTTLKeeper struct {
+ tokens map[string]time.Time
+ donec chan struct{}
+ stopc chan struct{}
+ deleteTokenFunc func(string)
+ mu *sync.Mutex
+}
+
+func (tm *simpleTokenTTLKeeper) stop() {
+ select {
+ case tm.stopc <- struct{}{}:
+ case <-tm.donec:
+ }
+ <-tm.donec
+}
+
+func (tm *simpleTokenTTLKeeper) addSimpleToken(token string) {
+ tm.tokens[token] = time.Now().Add(simpleTokenTTL)
+}
+
+func (tm *simpleTokenTTLKeeper) resetSimpleToken(token string) {
+ if _, ok := tm.tokens[token]; ok {
+ tm.tokens[token] = time.Now().Add(simpleTokenTTL)
+ }
+}
+
+func (tm *simpleTokenTTLKeeper) deleteSimpleToken(token string) {
+ delete(tm.tokens, token)
+}
+
+func (tm *simpleTokenTTLKeeper) run() {
+ tokenTicker := time.NewTicker(simpleTokenTTLResolution)
+ defer func() {
+ tokenTicker.Stop()
+ close(tm.donec)
+ }()
+ for {
+ select {
+ case <-tokenTicker.C:
+ nowtime := time.Now()
+ tm.mu.Lock()
+ for t, tokenendtime := range tm.tokens {
+ if nowtime.After(tokenendtime) {
+ tm.deleteTokenFunc(t)
+ delete(tm.tokens, t)
+ }
+ }
+ tm.mu.Unlock()
+ case <-tm.stopc:
+ return
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+type tokenSimple struct {
+ indexWaiter func(uint64) <-chan struct{}
+ simpleTokenKeeper *simpleTokenTTLKeeper
+ simpleTokensMu sync.Mutex
+ simpleTokens map[string]string // token -> username
+}
+
+func (t *tokenSimple) genTokenPrefix() (string, error) {
+ ret := make([]byte, defaultSimpleTokenLength)
+
+ for i := 0; i < defaultSimpleTokenLength; i++ {
+ bInt, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(int64(len(letters))))
+ if err != nil {
+ return "", err
+ }
+
+ ret[i] = letters[bInt.Int64()]
+ }
+
+ return string(ret), nil
+}
+
+func (t *tokenSimple) assignSimpleTokenToUser(username, token string) {
+ t.simpleTokensMu.Lock()
+ defer t.simpleTokensMu.Unlock()
+ if t.simpleTokenKeeper == nil {
+ return
+ }
+
+ _, ok := t.simpleTokens[token]
+ if ok {
+ plog.Panicf("token %s is alredy used", token)
+ }
+
+ t.simpleTokens[token] = username
+ t.simpleTokenKeeper.addSimpleToken(token)
+}
+
+func (t *tokenSimple) invalidateUser(username string) {
+ if t.simpleTokenKeeper == nil {
+ return
+ }
+ t.simpleTokensMu.Lock()
+ for token, name := range t.simpleTokens {
+ if strings.Compare(name, username) == 0 {
+ delete(t.simpleTokens, token)
+ t.simpleTokenKeeper.deleteSimpleToken(token)
+ }
+ }
+ t.simpleTokensMu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (t *tokenSimple) enable() {
+ delf := func(tk string) {
+ if username, ok := t.simpleTokens[tk]; ok {
+ plog.Infof("deleting token %s for user %s", tk, username)
+ delete(t.simpleTokens, tk)
+ }
+ }
+ t.simpleTokenKeeper = &simpleTokenTTLKeeper{
+ tokens: make(map[string]time.Time),
+ donec: make(chan struct{}),
+ stopc: make(chan struct{}),
+ deleteTokenFunc: delf,
+ mu: &t.simpleTokensMu,
+ }
+ go t.simpleTokenKeeper.run()
+}
+
+func (t *tokenSimple) disable() {
+ t.simpleTokensMu.Lock()
+ tk := t.simpleTokenKeeper
+ t.simpleTokenKeeper = nil
+ t.simpleTokens = make(map[string]string) // invalidate all tokens
+ t.simpleTokensMu.Unlock()
+ if tk != nil {
+ tk.stop()
+ }
+}
+
+func (t *tokenSimple) info(ctx context.Context, token string, revision uint64) (*AuthInfo, bool) {
+ if !t.isValidSimpleToken(ctx, token) {
+ return nil, false
+ }
+ t.simpleTokensMu.Lock()
+ username, ok := t.simpleTokens[token]
+ if ok && t.simpleTokenKeeper != nil {
+ t.simpleTokenKeeper.resetSimpleToken(token)
+ }
+ t.simpleTokensMu.Unlock()
+ return &AuthInfo{Username: username, Revision: revision}, ok
+}
+
+func (t *tokenSimple) assign(ctx context.Context, username string, rev uint64) (string, error) {
+ // rev isn't used in simple token, it is only used in JWT
+ index := ctx.Value(AuthenticateParamIndex{}).(uint64)
+ simpleTokenPrefix := ctx.Value(AuthenticateParamSimpleTokenPrefix{}).(string)
+ token := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%d", simpleTokenPrefix, index)
+ t.assignSimpleTokenToUser(username, token)
+
+ return token, nil
+}
+
+func (t *tokenSimple) isValidSimpleToken(ctx context.Context, token string) bool {
+ splitted := strings.Split(token, ".")
+ if len(splitted) != 2 {
+ return false
+ }
+ index, err := strconv.Atoi(splitted[1])
+ if err != nil {
+ return false
+ }
+
+ select {
+ case <-t.indexWaiter(uint64(index)):
+ return true
+ case <-ctx.Done():
+ }
+
+ return false
+}
+
+func newTokenProviderSimple(indexWaiter func(uint64) <-chan struct{}) *tokenSimple {
+ return &tokenSimple{
+ simpleTokens: make(map[string]string),
+ indexWaiter: indexWaiter,
+ }
+}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/store.go b/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/store.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d676cb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/store.go
@@ -0,0 +1,1136 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The etcd Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package auth
+
+import (
+ "bytes"
+ "context"
+ "encoding/binary"
+ "errors"
+ "sort"
+ "strings"
+ "sync"
+ "sync/atomic"
+
+ "github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/authpb"
+ pb "github.com/coreos/etcd/etcdserver/etcdserverpb"
+ "github.com/coreos/etcd/mvcc/backend"
+
+ "github.com/coreos/pkg/capnslog"
+ "golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
+ "google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
+ "google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
+ "google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
+)
+
+var (
+ enableFlagKey = []byte("authEnabled")
+ authEnabled = []byte{1}
+ authDisabled = []byte{0}
+
+ revisionKey = []byte("authRevision")
+
+ authBucketName = []byte("auth")
+ authUsersBucketName = []byte("authUsers")
+ authRolesBucketName = []byte("authRoles")
+
+ plog = capnslog.NewPackageLogger("github.com/coreos/etcd", "auth")
+
+ ErrRootUserNotExist = errors.New("auth: root user does not exist")
+ ErrRootRoleNotExist = errors.New("auth: root user does not have root role")
+ ErrUserAlreadyExist = errors.New("auth: user already exists")
+ ErrUserEmpty = errors.New("auth: user name is empty")
+ ErrUserNotFound = errors.New("auth: user not found")
+ ErrRoleAlreadyExist = errors.New("auth: role already exists")
+ ErrRoleNotFound = errors.New("auth: role not found")
+ ErrAuthFailed = errors.New("auth: authentication failed, invalid user ID or password")
+ ErrPermissionDenied = errors.New("auth: permission denied")
+ ErrRoleNotGranted = errors.New("auth: role is not granted to the user")
+ ErrPermissionNotGranted = errors.New("auth: permission is not granted to the role")
+ ErrAuthNotEnabled = errors.New("auth: authentication is not enabled")
+ ErrAuthOldRevision = errors.New("auth: revision in header is old")
+ ErrInvalidAuthToken = errors.New("auth: invalid auth token")
+ ErrInvalidAuthOpts = errors.New("auth: invalid auth options")
+ ErrInvalidAuthMgmt = errors.New("auth: invalid auth management")
+
+ // BcryptCost is the algorithm cost / strength for hashing auth passwords
+ BcryptCost = bcrypt.DefaultCost
+)
+
+const (
+ rootUser = "root"
+ rootRole = "root"
+
+ tokenTypeSimple = "simple"
+ tokenTypeJWT = "jwt"
+
+ revBytesLen = 8
+)
+
+type AuthInfo struct {
+ Username string
+ Revision uint64
+}
+
+// AuthenticateParamIndex is used for a key of context in the parameters of Authenticate()
+type AuthenticateParamIndex struct{}
+
+// AuthenticateParamSimpleTokenPrefix is used for a key of context in the parameters of Authenticate()
+type AuthenticateParamSimpleTokenPrefix struct{}
+
+type AuthStore interface {
+ // AuthEnable turns on the authentication feature
+ AuthEnable() error
+
+ // AuthDisable turns off the authentication feature
+ AuthDisable()
+
+ // Authenticate does authentication based on given user name and password
+ Authenticate(ctx context.Context, username, password string) (*pb.AuthenticateResponse, error)
+
+ // Recover recovers the state of auth store from the given backend
+ Recover(b backend.Backend)
+
+ // UserAdd adds a new user
+ UserAdd(r *pb.AuthUserAddRequest) (*pb.AuthUserAddResponse, error)
+
+ // UserDelete deletes a user
+ UserDelete(r *pb.AuthUserDeleteRequest) (*pb.AuthUserDeleteResponse, error)
+
+ // UserChangePassword changes a password of a user
+ UserChangePassword(r *pb.AuthUserChangePasswordRequest) (*pb.AuthUserChangePasswordResponse, error)
+
+ // UserGrantRole grants a role to the user
+ UserGrantRole(r *pb.AuthUserGrantRoleRequest) (*pb.AuthUserGrantRoleResponse, error)
+
+ // UserGet gets the detailed information of a users
+ UserGet(r *pb.AuthUserGetRequest) (*pb.AuthUserGetResponse, error)
+
+ // UserRevokeRole revokes a role of a user
+ UserRevokeRole(r *pb.AuthUserRevokeRoleRequest) (*pb.AuthUserRevokeRoleResponse, error)
+
+ // RoleAdd adds a new role
+ RoleAdd(r *pb.AuthRoleAddRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleAddResponse, error)
+
+ // RoleGrantPermission grants a permission to a role
+ RoleGrantPermission(r *pb.AuthRoleGrantPermissionRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleGrantPermissionResponse, error)
+
+ // RoleGet gets the detailed information of a role
+ RoleGet(r *pb.AuthRoleGetRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleGetResponse, error)
+
+ // RoleRevokePermission gets the detailed information of a role
+ RoleRevokePermission(r *pb.AuthRoleRevokePermissionRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleRevokePermissionResponse, error)
+
+ // RoleDelete gets the detailed information of a role
+ RoleDelete(r *pb.AuthRoleDeleteRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleDeleteResponse, error)
+
+ // UserList gets a list of all users
+ UserList(r *pb.AuthUserListRequest) (*pb.AuthUserListResponse, error)
+
+ // RoleList gets a list of all roles
+ RoleList(r *pb.AuthRoleListRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleListResponse, error)
+
+ // IsPutPermitted checks put permission of the user
+ IsPutPermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo, key []byte) error
+
+ // IsRangePermitted checks range permission of the user
+ IsRangePermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo, key, rangeEnd []byte) error
+
+ // IsDeleteRangePermitted checks delete-range permission of the user
+ IsDeleteRangePermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo, key, rangeEnd []byte) error
+
+ // IsAdminPermitted checks admin permission of the user
+ IsAdminPermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo) error
+
+ // GenTokenPrefix produces a random string in a case of simple token
+ // in a case of JWT, it produces an empty string
+ GenTokenPrefix() (string, error)
+
+ // Revision gets current revision of authStore
+ Revision() uint64
+
+ // CheckPassword checks a given pair of username and password is correct
+ CheckPassword(username, password string) (uint64, error)
+
+ // Close does cleanup of AuthStore
+ Close() error
+
+ // AuthInfoFromCtx gets AuthInfo from gRPC's context
+ AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx context.Context) (*AuthInfo, error)
+
+ // AuthInfoFromTLS gets AuthInfo from TLS info of gRPC's context
+ AuthInfoFromTLS(ctx context.Context) *AuthInfo
+
+ // WithRoot generates and installs a token that can be used as a root credential
+ WithRoot(ctx context.Context) context.Context
+
+ // HasRole checks that user has role
+ HasRole(user, role string) bool
+}
+
+type TokenProvider interface {
+ info(ctx context.Context, token string, revision uint64) (*AuthInfo, bool)
+ assign(ctx context.Context, username string, revision uint64) (string, error)
+ enable()
+ disable()
+
+ invalidateUser(string)
+ genTokenPrefix() (string, error)
+}
+
+type authStore struct {
+ // atomic operations; need 64-bit align, or 32-bit tests will crash
+ revision uint64
+
+ be backend.Backend
+ enabled bool
+ enabledMu sync.RWMutex
+
+ rangePermCache map[string]*unifiedRangePermissions // username -> unifiedRangePermissions
+
+ tokenProvider TokenProvider
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) AuthEnable() error {
+ as.enabledMu.Lock()
+ defer as.enabledMu.Unlock()
+ if as.enabled {
+ plog.Noticef("Authentication already enabled")
+ return nil
+ }
+ b := as.be
+ tx := b.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ defer func() {
+ tx.Unlock()
+ b.ForceCommit()
+ }()
+
+ u := getUser(tx, rootUser)
+ if u == nil {
+ return ErrRootUserNotExist
+ }
+
+ if !hasRootRole(u) {
+ return ErrRootRoleNotExist
+ }
+
+ tx.UnsafePut(authBucketName, enableFlagKey, authEnabled)
+
+ as.enabled = true
+ as.tokenProvider.enable()
+
+ as.rangePermCache = make(map[string]*unifiedRangePermissions)
+
+ as.setRevision(getRevision(tx))
+
+ plog.Noticef("Authentication enabled")
+
+ return nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) AuthDisable() {
+ as.enabledMu.Lock()
+ defer as.enabledMu.Unlock()
+ if !as.enabled {
+ return
+ }
+ b := as.be
+ tx := b.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ tx.UnsafePut(authBucketName, enableFlagKey, authDisabled)
+ as.commitRevision(tx)
+ tx.Unlock()
+ b.ForceCommit()
+
+ as.enabled = false
+ as.tokenProvider.disable()
+
+ plog.Noticef("Authentication disabled")
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) Close() error {
+ as.enabledMu.Lock()
+ defer as.enabledMu.Unlock()
+ if !as.enabled {
+ return nil
+ }
+ as.tokenProvider.disable()
+ return nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, username, password string) (*pb.AuthenticateResponse, error) {
+ if !as.isAuthEnabled() {
+ return nil, ErrAuthNotEnabled
+ }
+
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ defer tx.Unlock()
+
+ user := getUser(tx, username)
+ if user == nil {
+ return nil, ErrAuthFailed
+ }
+
+ // Password checking is already performed in the API layer, so we don't need to check for now.
+ // Staleness of password can be detected with OCC in the API layer, too.
+
+ token, err := as.tokenProvider.assign(ctx, username, as.Revision())
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ plog.Debugf("authorized %s, token is %s", username, token)
+ return &pb.AuthenticateResponse{Token: token}, nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) CheckPassword(username, password string) (uint64, error) {
+ if !as.isAuthEnabled() {
+ return 0, ErrAuthNotEnabled
+ }
+
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ defer tx.Unlock()
+
+ user := getUser(tx, username)
+ if user == nil {
+ return 0, ErrAuthFailed
+ }
+
+ if bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword(user.Password, []byte(password)) != nil {
+ plog.Noticef("authentication failed, invalid password for user %s", username)
+ return 0, ErrAuthFailed
+ }
+
+ return getRevision(tx), nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) Recover(be backend.Backend) {
+ enabled := false
+ as.be = be
+ tx := be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ _, vs := tx.UnsafeRange(authBucketName, enableFlagKey, nil, 0)
+ if len(vs) == 1 {
+ if bytes.Equal(vs[0], authEnabled) {
+ enabled = true
+ }
+ }
+
+ as.setRevision(getRevision(tx))
+
+ tx.Unlock()
+
+ as.enabledMu.Lock()
+ as.enabled = enabled
+ as.enabledMu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) UserAdd(r *pb.AuthUserAddRequest) (*pb.AuthUserAddResponse, error) {
+ if len(r.Name) == 0 {
+ return nil, ErrUserEmpty
+ }
+
+ hashed, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(r.Password), BcryptCost)
+ if err != nil {
+ plog.Errorf("failed to hash password: %s", err)
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ defer tx.Unlock()
+
+ user := getUser(tx, r.Name)
+ if user != nil {
+ return nil, ErrUserAlreadyExist
+ }
+
+ newUser := &authpb.User{
+ Name: []byte(r.Name),
+ Password: hashed,
+ }
+
+ putUser(tx, newUser)
+
+ as.commitRevision(tx)
+
+ plog.Noticef("added a new user: %s", r.Name)
+
+ return &pb.AuthUserAddResponse{}, nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) UserDelete(r *pb.AuthUserDeleteRequest) (*pb.AuthUserDeleteResponse, error) {
+ if as.enabled && strings.Compare(r.Name, rootUser) == 0 {
+ plog.Errorf("the user root must not be deleted")
+ return nil, ErrInvalidAuthMgmt
+ }
+
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ defer tx.Unlock()
+
+ user := getUser(tx, r.Name)
+ if user == nil {
+ return nil, ErrUserNotFound
+ }
+
+ delUser(tx, r.Name)
+
+ as.commitRevision(tx)
+
+ as.invalidateCachedPerm(r.Name)
+ as.tokenProvider.invalidateUser(r.Name)
+
+ plog.Noticef("deleted a user: %s", r.Name)
+
+ return &pb.AuthUserDeleteResponse{}, nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) UserChangePassword(r *pb.AuthUserChangePasswordRequest) (*pb.AuthUserChangePasswordResponse, error) {
+ // TODO(mitake): measure the cost of bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword()
+ // If the cost is too high, we should move the encryption to outside of the raft
+ hashed, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(r.Password), BcryptCost)
+ if err != nil {
+ plog.Errorf("failed to hash password: %s", err)
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ defer tx.Unlock()
+
+ user := getUser(tx, r.Name)
+ if user == nil {
+ return nil, ErrUserNotFound
+ }
+
+ updatedUser := &authpb.User{
+ Name: []byte(r.Name),
+ Roles: user.Roles,
+ Password: hashed,
+ }
+
+ putUser(tx, updatedUser)
+
+ as.commitRevision(tx)
+
+ as.invalidateCachedPerm(r.Name)
+ as.tokenProvider.invalidateUser(r.Name)
+
+ plog.Noticef("changed a password of a user: %s", r.Name)
+
+ return &pb.AuthUserChangePasswordResponse{}, nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) UserGrantRole(r *pb.AuthUserGrantRoleRequest) (*pb.AuthUserGrantRoleResponse, error) {
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ defer tx.Unlock()
+
+ user := getUser(tx, r.User)
+ if user == nil {
+ return nil, ErrUserNotFound
+ }
+
+ if r.Role != rootRole {
+ role := getRole(tx, r.Role)
+ if role == nil {
+ return nil, ErrRoleNotFound
+ }
+ }
+
+ idx := sort.SearchStrings(user.Roles, r.Role)
+ if idx < len(user.Roles) && strings.Compare(user.Roles[idx], r.Role) == 0 {
+ plog.Warningf("user %s is already granted role %s", r.User, r.Role)
+ return &pb.AuthUserGrantRoleResponse{}, nil
+ }
+
+ user.Roles = append(user.Roles, r.Role)
+ sort.Strings(user.Roles)
+
+ putUser(tx, user)
+
+ as.invalidateCachedPerm(r.User)
+
+ as.commitRevision(tx)
+
+ plog.Noticef("granted role %s to user %s", r.Role, r.User)
+ return &pb.AuthUserGrantRoleResponse{}, nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) UserGet(r *pb.AuthUserGetRequest) (*pb.AuthUserGetResponse, error) {
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ user := getUser(tx, r.Name)
+ tx.Unlock()
+
+ if user == nil {
+ return nil, ErrUserNotFound
+ }
+
+ var resp pb.AuthUserGetResponse
+ resp.Roles = append(resp.Roles, user.Roles...)
+ return &resp, nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) UserList(r *pb.AuthUserListRequest) (*pb.AuthUserListResponse, error) {
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ users := getAllUsers(tx)
+ tx.Unlock()
+
+ resp := &pb.AuthUserListResponse{Users: make([]string, len(users))}
+ for i := range users {
+ resp.Users[i] = string(users[i].Name)
+ }
+ return resp, nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) UserRevokeRole(r *pb.AuthUserRevokeRoleRequest) (*pb.AuthUserRevokeRoleResponse, error) {
+ if as.enabled && strings.Compare(r.Name, rootUser) == 0 && strings.Compare(r.Role, rootRole) == 0 {
+ plog.Errorf("the role root must not be revoked from the user root")
+ return nil, ErrInvalidAuthMgmt
+ }
+
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ defer tx.Unlock()
+
+ user := getUser(tx, r.Name)
+ if user == nil {
+ return nil, ErrUserNotFound
+ }
+
+ updatedUser := &authpb.User{
+ Name: user.Name,
+ Password: user.Password,
+ }
+
+ for _, role := range user.Roles {
+ if strings.Compare(role, r.Role) != 0 {
+ updatedUser.Roles = append(updatedUser.Roles, role)
+ }
+ }
+
+ if len(updatedUser.Roles) == len(user.Roles) {
+ return nil, ErrRoleNotGranted
+ }
+
+ putUser(tx, updatedUser)
+
+ as.invalidateCachedPerm(r.Name)
+
+ as.commitRevision(tx)
+
+ plog.Noticef("revoked role %s from user %s", r.Role, r.Name)
+ return &pb.AuthUserRevokeRoleResponse{}, nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) RoleGet(r *pb.AuthRoleGetRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleGetResponse, error) {
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ defer tx.Unlock()
+
+ var resp pb.AuthRoleGetResponse
+
+ role := getRole(tx, r.Role)
+ if role == nil {
+ return nil, ErrRoleNotFound
+ }
+ resp.Perm = append(resp.Perm, role.KeyPermission...)
+ return &resp, nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) RoleList(r *pb.AuthRoleListRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleListResponse, error) {
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ roles := getAllRoles(tx)
+ tx.Unlock()
+
+ resp := &pb.AuthRoleListResponse{Roles: make([]string, len(roles))}
+ for i := range roles {
+ resp.Roles[i] = string(roles[i].Name)
+ }
+ return resp, nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) RoleRevokePermission(r *pb.AuthRoleRevokePermissionRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleRevokePermissionResponse, error) {
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ defer tx.Unlock()
+
+ role := getRole(tx, r.Role)
+ if role == nil {
+ return nil, ErrRoleNotFound
+ }
+
+ updatedRole := &authpb.Role{
+ Name: role.Name,
+ }
+
+ for _, perm := range role.KeyPermission {
+ if !bytes.Equal(perm.Key, []byte(r.Key)) || !bytes.Equal(perm.RangeEnd, []byte(r.RangeEnd)) {
+ updatedRole.KeyPermission = append(updatedRole.KeyPermission, perm)
+ }
+ }
+
+ if len(role.KeyPermission) == len(updatedRole.KeyPermission) {
+ return nil, ErrPermissionNotGranted
+ }
+
+ putRole(tx, updatedRole)
+
+ // TODO(mitake): currently single role update invalidates every cache
+ // It should be optimized.
+ as.clearCachedPerm()
+
+ as.commitRevision(tx)
+
+ plog.Noticef("revoked key %s from role %s", r.Key, r.Role)
+ return &pb.AuthRoleRevokePermissionResponse{}, nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) RoleDelete(r *pb.AuthRoleDeleteRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleDeleteResponse, error) {
+ if as.enabled && strings.Compare(r.Role, rootRole) == 0 {
+ plog.Errorf("the role root must not be deleted")
+ return nil, ErrInvalidAuthMgmt
+ }
+
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ defer tx.Unlock()
+
+ role := getRole(tx, r.Role)
+ if role == nil {
+ return nil, ErrRoleNotFound
+ }
+
+ delRole(tx, r.Role)
+
+ users := getAllUsers(tx)
+ for _, user := range users {
+ updatedUser := &authpb.User{
+ Name: user.Name,
+ Password: user.Password,
+ }
+
+ for _, role := range user.Roles {
+ if strings.Compare(role, r.Role) != 0 {
+ updatedUser.Roles = append(updatedUser.Roles, role)
+ }
+ }
+
+ if len(updatedUser.Roles) == len(user.Roles) {
+ continue
+ }
+
+ putUser(tx, updatedUser)
+
+ as.invalidateCachedPerm(string(user.Name))
+ }
+
+ as.commitRevision(tx)
+
+ plog.Noticef("deleted role %s", r.Role)
+ return &pb.AuthRoleDeleteResponse{}, nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) RoleAdd(r *pb.AuthRoleAddRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleAddResponse, error) {
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ defer tx.Unlock()
+
+ role := getRole(tx, r.Name)
+ if role != nil {
+ return nil, ErrRoleAlreadyExist
+ }
+
+ newRole := &authpb.Role{
+ Name: []byte(r.Name),
+ }
+
+ putRole(tx, newRole)
+
+ as.commitRevision(tx)
+
+ plog.Noticef("Role %s is created", r.Name)
+
+ return &pb.AuthRoleAddResponse{}, nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) authInfoFromToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*AuthInfo, bool) {
+ return as.tokenProvider.info(ctx, token, as.Revision())
+}
+
+type permSlice []*authpb.Permission
+
+func (perms permSlice) Len() int {
+ return len(perms)
+}
+
+func (perms permSlice) Less(i, j int) bool {
+ return bytes.Compare(perms[i].Key, perms[j].Key) < 0
+}
+
+func (perms permSlice) Swap(i, j int) {
+ perms[i], perms[j] = perms[j], perms[i]
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) RoleGrantPermission(r *pb.AuthRoleGrantPermissionRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleGrantPermissionResponse, error) {
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ defer tx.Unlock()
+
+ role := getRole(tx, r.Name)
+ if role == nil {
+ return nil, ErrRoleNotFound
+ }
+
+ idx := sort.Search(len(role.KeyPermission), func(i int) bool {
+ return bytes.Compare(role.KeyPermission[i].Key, []byte(r.Perm.Key)) >= 0
+ })
+
+ if idx < len(role.KeyPermission) && bytes.Equal(role.KeyPermission[idx].Key, r.Perm.Key) && bytes.Equal(role.KeyPermission[idx].RangeEnd, r.Perm.RangeEnd) {
+ // update existing permission
+ role.KeyPermission[idx].PermType = r.Perm.PermType
+ } else {
+ // append new permission to the role
+ newPerm := &authpb.Permission{
+ Key: []byte(r.Perm.Key),
+ RangeEnd: []byte(r.Perm.RangeEnd),
+ PermType: r.Perm.PermType,
+ }
+
+ role.KeyPermission = append(role.KeyPermission, newPerm)
+ sort.Sort(permSlice(role.KeyPermission))
+ }
+
+ putRole(tx, role)
+
+ // TODO(mitake): currently single role update invalidates every cache
+ // It should be optimized.
+ as.clearCachedPerm()
+
+ as.commitRevision(tx)
+
+ plog.Noticef("role %s's permission of key %s is updated as %s", r.Name, r.Perm.Key, authpb.Permission_Type_name[int32(r.Perm.PermType)])
+
+ return &pb.AuthRoleGrantPermissionResponse{}, nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) isOpPermitted(userName string, revision uint64, key, rangeEnd []byte, permTyp authpb.Permission_Type) error {
+ // TODO(mitake): this function would be costly so we need a caching mechanism
+ if !as.isAuthEnabled() {
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ // only gets rev == 0 when passed AuthInfo{}; no user given
+ if revision == 0 {
+ return ErrUserEmpty
+ }
+
+ if revision < as.Revision() {
+ return ErrAuthOldRevision
+ }
+
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ defer tx.Unlock()
+
+ user := getUser(tx, userName)
+ if user == nil {
+ plog.Errorf("invalid user name %s for permission checking", userName)
+ return ErrPermissionDenied
+ }
+
+ // root role should have permission on all ranges
+ if hasRootRole(user) {
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ if as.isRangeOpPermitted(tx, userName, key, rangeEnd, permTyp) {
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ return ErrPermissionDenied
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) IsPutPermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo, key []byte) error {
+ return as.isOpPermitted(authInfo.Username, authInfo.Revision, key, nil, authpb.WRITE)
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) IsRangePermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo, key, rangeEnd []byte) error {
+ return as.isOpPermitted(authInfo.Username, authInfo.Revision, key, rangeEnd, authpb.READ)
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) IsDeleteRangePermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo, key, rangeEnd []byte) error {
+ return as.isOpPermitted(authInfo.Username, authInfo.Revision, key, rangeEnd, authpb.WRITE)
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) IsAdminPermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo) error {
+ if !as.isAuthEnabled() {
+ return nil
+ }
+ if authInfo == nil {
+ return ErrUserEmpty
+ }
+
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ u := getUser(tx, authInfo.Username)
+ tx.Unlock()
+
+ if u == nil {
+ return ErrUserNotFound
+ }
+
+ if !hasRootRole(u) {
+ return ErrPermissionDenied
+ }
+
+ return nil
+}
+
+func getUser(tx backend.BatchTx, username string) *authpb.User {
+ _, vs := tx.UnsafeRange(authUsersBucketName, []byte(username), nil, 0)
+ if len(vs) == 0 {
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ user := &authpb.User{}
+ err := user.Unmarshal(vs[0])
+ if err != nil {
+ plog.Panicf("failed to unmarshal user struct (name: %s): %s", username, err)
+ }
+ return user
+}
+
+func getAllUsers(tx backend.BatchTx) []*authpb.User {
+ _, vs := tx.UnsafeRange(authUsersBucketName, []byte{0}, []byte{0xff}, -1)
+ if len(vs) == 0 {
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ users := make([]*authpb.User, len(vs))
+ for i := range vs {
+ user := &authpb.User{}
+ err := user.Unmarshal(vs[i])
+ if err != nil {
+ plog.Panicf("failed to unmarshal user struct: %s", err)
+ }
+ users[i] = user
+ }
+ return users
+}
+
+func putUser(tx backend.BatchTx, user *authpb.User) {
+ b, err := user.Marshal()
+ if err != nil {
+ plog.Panicf("failed to marshal user struct (name: %s): %s", user.Name, err)
+ }
+ tx.UnsafePut(authUsersBucketName, user.Name, b)
+}
+
+func delUser(tx backend.BatchTx, username string) {
+ tx.UnsafeDelete(authUsersBucketName, []byte(username))
+}
+
+func getRole(tx backend.BatchTx, rolename string) *authpb.Role {
+ _, vs := tx.UnsafeRange(authRolesBucketName, []byte(rolename), nil, 0)
+ if len(vs) == 0 {
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ role := &authpb.Role{}
+ err := role.Unmarshal(vs[0])
+ if err != nil {
+ plog.Panicf("failed to unmarshal role struct (name: %s): %s", rolename, err)
+ }
+ return role
+}
+
+func getAllRoles(tx backend.BatchTx) []*authpb.Role {
+ _, vs := tx.UnsafeRange(authRolesBucketName, []byte{0}, []byte{0xff}, -1)
+ if len(vs) == 0 {
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ roles := make([]*authpb.Role, len(vs))
+ for i := range vs {
+ role := &authpb.Role{}
+ err := role.Unmarshal(vs[i])
+ if err != nil {
+ plog.Panicf("failed to unmarshal role struct: %s", err)
+ }
+ roles[i] = role
+ }
+ return roles
+}
+
+func putRole(tx backend.BatchTx, role *authpb.Role) {
+ b, err := role.Marshal()
+ if err != nil {
+ plog.Panicf("failed to marshal role struct (name: %s): %s", role.Name, err)
+ }
+
+ tx.UnsafePut(authRolesBucketName, []byte(role.Name), b)
+}
+
+func delRole(tx backend.BatchTx, rolename string) {
+ tx.UnsafeDelete(authRolesBucketName, []byte(rolename))
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) isAuthEnabled() bool {
+ as.enabledMu.RLock()
+ defer as.enabledMu.RUnlock()
+ return as.enabled
+}
+
+func NewAuthStore(be backend.Backend, tp TokenProvider) *authStore {
+ tx := be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+
+ tx.UnsafeCreateBucket(authBucketName)
+ tx.UnsafeCreateBucket(authUsersBucketName)
+ tx.UnsafeCreateBucket(authRolesBucketName)
+
+ enabled := false
+ _, vs := tx.UnsafeRange(authBucketName, enableFlagKey, nil, 0)
+ if len(vs) == 1 {
+ if bytes.Equal(vs[0], authEnabled) {
+ enabled = true
+ }
+ }
+
+ as := &authStore{
+ be: be,
+ revision: getRevision(tx),
+ enabled: enabled,
+ rangePermCache: make(map[string]*unifiedRangePermissions),
+ tokenProvider: tp,
+ }
+
+ if enabled {
+ as.tokenProvider.enable()
+ }
+
+ if as.Revision() == 0 {
+ as.commitRevision(tx)
+ }
+
+ tx.Unlock()
+ be.ForceCommit()
+
+ return as
+}
+
+func hasRootRole(u *authpb.User) bool {
+ // u.Roles is sorted in UserGrantRole(), so we can use binary search.
+ idx := sort.SearchStrings(u.Roles, rootRole)
+ return idx != len(u.Roles) && u.Roles[idx] == rootRole
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) commitRevision(tx backend.BatchTx) {
+ atomic.AddUint64(&as.revision, 1)
+ revBytes := make([]byte, revBytesLen)
+ binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(revBytes, as.Revision())
+ tx.UnsafePut(authBucketName, revisionKey, revBytes)
+}
+
+func getRevision(tx backend.BatchTx) uint64 {
+ _, vs := tx.UnsafeRange(authBucketName, []byte(revisionKey), nil, 0)
+ if len(vs) != 1 {
+ // this can happen in the initialization phase
+ return 0
+ }
+
+ return binary.BigEndian.Uint64(vs[0])
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) setRevision(rev uint64) {
+ atomic.StoreUint64(&as.revision, rev)
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) Revision() uint64 {
+ return atomic.LoadUint64(&as.revision)
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) AuthInfoFromTLS(ctx context.Context) *AuthInfo {
+ peer, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
+ if !ok || peer == nil || peer.AuthInfo == nil {
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ tlsInfo := peer.AuthInfo.(credentials.TLSInfo)
+ for _, chains := range tlsInfo.State.VerifiedChains {
+ for _, chain := range chains {
+ cn := chain.Subject.CommonName
+ plog.Debugf("found common name %s", cn)
+
+ ai := &AuthInfo{
+ Username: cn,
+ Revision: as.Revision(),
+ }
+ md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
+ if !ok {
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ // gRPC-gateway proxy request to etcd server includes Grpcgateway-Accept
+ // header. The proxy uses etcd client server certificate. If the certificate
+ // has a CommonName we should never use this for authentication.
+ if gw := md["grpcgateway-accept"]; len(gw) > 0 {
+ plog.Warningf("ignoring common name in gRPC-gateway proxy request %s", ai.Username)
+ return nil
+ }
+ return ai
+ }
+ }
+
+ return nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx context.Context) (*AuthInfo, error) {
+ md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
+ if !ok {
+ return nil, nil
+ }
+
+ //TODO(mitake|hexfusion) review unifying key names
+ ts, ok := md["token"]
+ if !ok {
+ ts, ok = md["authorization"]
+ }
+ if !ok {
+ return nil, nil
+ }
+
+ token := ts[0]
+ authInfo, uok := as.authInfoFromToken(ctx, token)
+ if !uok {
+ plog.Warningf("invalid auth token: %s", token)
+ return nil, ErrInvalidAuthToken
+ }
+
+ return authInfo, nil
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) GenTokenPrefix() (string, error) {
+ return as.tokenProvider.genTokenPrefix()
+}
+
+func decomposeOpts(optstr string) (string, map[string]string, error) {
+ opts := strings.Split(optstr, ",")
+ tokenType := opts[0]
+
+ typeSpecificOpts := make(map[string]string)
+ for i := 1; i < len(opts); i++ {
+ pair := strings.Split(opts[i], "=")
+
+ if len(pair) != 2 {
+ plog.Errorf("invalid token specific option: %s", optstr)
+ return "", nil, ErrInvalidAuthOpts
+ }
+
+ if _, ok := typeSpecificOpts[pair[0]]; ok {
+ plog.Errorf("invalid token specific option, duplicated parameters (%s): %s", pair[0], optstr)
+ return "", nil, ErrInvalidAuthOpts
+ }
+
+ typeSpecificOpts[pair[0]] = pair[1]
+ }
+
+ return tokenType, typeSpecificOpts, nil
+
+}
+
+func NewTokenProvider(tokenOpts string, indexWaiter func(uint64) <-chan struct{}) (TokenProvider, error) {
+ tokenType, typeSpecificOpts, err := decomposeOpts(tokenOpts)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, ErrInvalidAuthOpts
+ }
+
+ switch tokenType {
+ case tokenTypeSimple:
+ plog.Warningf("simple token is not cryptographically signed")
+ return newTokenProviderSimple(indexWaiter), nil
+
+ case tokenTypeJWT:
+ return newTokenProviderJWT(typeSpecificOpts)
+
+ case "":
+ return newTokenProviderNop()
+ default:
+ plog.Errorf("unknown token type: %s", tokenType)
+ return nil, ErrInvalidAuthOpts
+ }
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) WithRoot(ctx context.Context) context.Context {
+ if !as.isAuthEnabled() {
+ return ctx
+ }
+
+ var ctxForAssign context.Context
+ if ts, ok := as.tokenProvider.(*tokenSimple); ok && ts != nil {
+ ctx1 := context.WithValue(ctx, AuthenticateParamIndex{}, uint64(0))
+ prefix, err := ts.genTokenPrefix()
+ if err != nil {
+ plog.Errorf("failed to generate prefix of internally used token")
+ return ctx
+ }
+ ctxForAssign = context.WithValue(ctx1, AuthenticateParamSimpleTokenPrefix{}, prefix)
+ } else {
+ ctxForAssign = ctx
+ }
+
+ token, err := as.tokenProvider.assign(ctxForAssign, "root", as.Revision())
+ if err != nil {
+ // this must not happen
+ plog.Errorf("failed to assign token for lease revoking: %s", err)
+ return ctx
+ }
+
+ mdMap := map[string]string{
+ "token": token,
+ }
+ tokenMD := metadata.New(mdMap)
+
+ // use "mdIncomingKey{}" since it's called from local etcdserver
+ return metadata.NewIncomingContext(ctx, tokenMD)
+}
+
+func (as *authStore) HasRole(user, role string) bool {
+ tx := as.be.BatchTx()
+ tx.Lock()
+ u := getUser(tx, user)
+ tx.Unlock()
+
+ if u == nil {
+ plog.Warningf("tried to check user %s has role %s, but user %s doesn't exist", user, role, user)
+ return false
+ }
+
+ for _, r := range u.Roles {
+ if role == r {
+ return true
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false
+}