VOL-2112 move to voltha-lib-go
Change-Id: Ic1af08003c1d2c698c0cce371e64f47b47b8d875
diff --git a/vendor/gopkg.in/jcmturner/gokrb5.v7/messages/APReq.go b/vendor/gopkg.in/jcmturner/gokrb5.v7/messages/APReq.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1ed4ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/gopkg.in/jcmturner/gokrb5.v7/messages/APReq.go
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+package messages
+
+import (
+ "fmt"
+ "time"
+
+ "github.com/jcmturner/gofork/encoding/asn1"
+ "gopkg.in/jcmturner/gokrb5.v7/asn1tools"
+ "gopkg.in/jcmturner/gokrb5.v7/crypto"
+ "gopkg.in/jcmturner/gokrb5.v7/iana"
+ "gopkg.in/jcmturner/gokrb5.v7/iana/asnAppTag"
+ "gopkg.in/jcmturner/gokrb5.v7/iana/errorcode"
+ "gopkg.in/jcmturner/gokrb5.v7/iana/keyusage"
+ "gopkg.in/jcmturner/gokrb5.v7/iana/msgtype"
+ "gopkg.in/jcmturner/gokrb5.v7/keytab"
+ "gopkg.in/jcmturner/gokrb5.v7/krberror"
+ "gopkg.in/jcmturner/gokrb5.v7/types"
+)
+
+/*AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE {
+pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
+msg-type [1] INTEGER (14),
+ap-options [2] APOptions,
+ticket [3] Ticket,
+authenticator [4] EncryptedData -- Authenticator
+}
+
+APOptions ::= KerberosFlags
+-- reserved(0),
+-- use-session-key(1),
+-- mutual-required(2)*/
+
+type marshalAPReq struct {
+ PVNO int `asn1:"explicit,tag:0"`
+ MsgType int `asn1:"explicit,tag:1"`
+ APOptions asn1.BitString `asn1:"explicit,tag:2"`
+ // Ticket needs to be a raw value as it is wrapped in an APPLICATION tag
+ Ticket asn1.RawValue `asn1:"explicit,tag:3"`
+ EncryptedAuthenticator types.EncryptedData `asn1:"explicit,tag:4"`
+}
+
+// APReq implements RFC 4120 KRB_AP_REQ: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4120#section-5.5.1.
+type APReq struct {
+ PVNO int `asn1:"explicit,tag:0"`
+ MsgType int `asn1:"explicit,tag:1"`
+ APOptions asn1.BitString `asn1:"explicit,tag:2"`
+ Ticket Ticket `asn1:"explicit,tag:3"`
+ EncryptedAuthenticator types.EncryptedData `asn1:"explicit,tag:4"`
+ Authenticator types.Authenticator `asn1:"optional"`
+}
+
+// NewAPReq generates a new KRB_AP_REQ struct.
+func NewAPReq(tkt Ticket, sessionKey types.EncryptionKey, auth types.Authenticator) (APReq, error) {
+ var a APReq
+ ed, err := encryptAuthenticator(auth, sessionKey, tkt)
+ if err != nil {
+ return a, krberror.Errorf(err, krberror.KRBMsgError, "error creating Authenticator for AP_REQ")
+ }
+ a = APReq{
+ PVNO: iana.PVNO,
+ MsgType: msgtype.KRB_AP_REQ,
+ APOptions: types.NewKrbFlags(),
+ Ticket: tkt,
+ EncryptedAuthenticator: ed,
+ }
+ return a, nil
+}
+
+// Encrypt Authenticator
+func encryptAuthenticator(a types.Authenticator, sessionKey types.EncryptionKey, tkt Ticket) (types.EncryptedData, error) {
+ var ed types.EncryptedData
+ m, err := a.Marshal()
+ if err != nil {
+ return ed, krberror.Errorf(err, krberror.EncodingError, "marshaling error of EncryptedData form of Authenticator")
+ }
+ usage := authenticatorKeyUsage(tkt.SName)
+ ed, err = crypto.GetEncryptedData(m, sessionKey, uint32(usage), tkt.EncPart.KVNO)
+ if err != nil {
+ return ed, krberror.Errorf(err, krberror.EncryptingError, "error encrypting Authenticator")
+ }
+ return ed, nil
+}
+
+// DecryptAuthenticator decrypts the Authenticator within the AP_REQ.
+// sessionKey may simply be the key within the decrypted EncPart of the ticket within the AP_REQ.
+func (a *APReq) DecryptAuthenticator(sessionKey types.EncryptionKey) error {
+ usage := authenticatorKeyUsage(a.Ticket.SName)
+ ab, e := crypto.DecryptEncPart(a.EncryptedAuthenticator, sessionKey, uint32(usage))
+ if e != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("error decrypting authenticator: %v", e)
+ }
+ err := a.Authenticator.Unmarshal(ab)
+ if err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("error unmarshaling authenticator: %v", err)
+ }
+ return nil
+}
+
+func authenticatorKeyUsage(pn types.PrincipalName) int {
+ if pn.NameString[0] == "krbtgt" {
+ return keyusage.TGS_REQ_PA_TGS_REQ_AP_REQ_AUTHENTICATOR
+ }
+ return keyusage.AP_REQ_AUTHENTICATOR
+}
+
+// Unmarshal bytes b into the APReq struct.
+func (a *APReq) Unmarshal(b []byte) error {
+ var m marshalAPReq
+ _, err := asn1.UnmarshalWithParams(b, &m, fmt.Sprintf("application,explicit,tag:%v", asnAppTag.APREQ))
+ if err != nil {
+ return krberror.Errorf(err, krberror.EncodingError, "unmarshal error of AP_REQ")
+ }
+ if m.MsgType != msgtype.KRB_AP_REQ {
+ return NewKRBError(types.PrincipalName{}, "", errorcode.KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE, errorcode.Lookup(errorcode.KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE))
+ }
+ a.PVNO = m.PVNO
+ a.MsgType = m.MsgType
+ a.APOptions = m.APOptions
+ a.EncryptedAuthenticator = m.EncryptedAuthenticator
+ a.Ticket, err = unmarshalTicket(m.Ticket.Bytes)
+ if err != nil {
+ return krberror.Errorf(err, krberror.EncodingError, "unmarshaling error of Ticket within AP_REQ")
+ }
+ return nil
+}
+
+// Marshal APReq struct.
+func (a *APReq) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
+ m := marshalAPReq{
+ PVNO: a.PVNO,
+ MsgType: a.MsgType,
+ APOptions: a.APOptions,
+ EncryptedAuthenticator: a.EncryptedAuthenticator,
+ }
+ var b []byte
+ b, err := a.Ticket.Marshal()
+ if err != nil {
+ return b, err
+ }
+ m.Ticket = asn1.RawValue{
+ Class: asn1.ClassContextSpecific,
+ IsCompound: true,
+ Tag: 3,
+ Bytes: b,
+ }
+ mk, err := asn1.Marshal(m)
+ if err != nil {
+ return mk, krberror.Errorf(err, krberror.EncodingError, "marshaling error of AP_REQ")
+ }
+ mk = asn1tools.AddASNAppTag(mk, asnAppTag.APREQ)
+ return mk, nil
+}
+
+// Verify an AP_REQ using service's keytab, spn and max acceptable clock skew duration.
+// The service ticket encrypted part and authenticator will be decrypted as part of this operation.
+func (a *APReq) Verify(kt *keytab.Keytab, d time.Duration, cAddr types.HostAddress) (bool, error) {
+ // Decrypt ticket's encrypted part with service key
+ //TODO decrypt with service's session key from its TGT is use-to-user. Need to figure out how to get TGT.
+ //if types.IsFlagSet(&a.APOptions, flags.APOptionUseSessionKey) {
+ // //If the USE-SESSION-KEY flag is set in the ap-options field, it indicates to
+ // //the server that user-to-user authentication is in use, and that the ticket
+ // //is encrypted in the session key from the server's TGT rather than in the server's secret key.
+ // err := a.Ticket.Decrypt(tgt.DecryptedEncPart.Key)
+ // if err != nil {
+ // return false, krberror.Errorf(err, krberror.DecryptingError, "error decrypting encpart of ticket provided using session key")
+ // }
+ //} else {
+ // // Because it is possible for the server to be registered in multiple
+ // // realms, with different keys in each, the srealm field in the
+ // // unencrypted portion of the ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is used to
+ // // specify which secret key the server should use to decrypt that
+ // // ticket.The KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY error code is returned if the server
+ // // doesn't have the proper key to decipher the ticket.
+ // // The ticket is decrypted using the version of the server's key
+ // // specified by the ticket.
+ // err := a.Ticket.DecryptEncPart(*kt, &a.Ticket.SName)
+ // if err != nil {
+ // return false, krberror.Errorf(err, krberror.DecryptingError, "error decrypting encpart of service ticket provided")
+ // }
+ //}
+ err := a.Ticket.DecryptEncPart(kt, &a.Ticket.SName)
+ if err != nil {
+ return false, krberror.Errorf(err, krberror.DecryptingError, "error decrypting encpart of service ticket provided")
+ }
+
+ // Check time validity of ticket
+ ok, err := a.Ticket.Valid(d)
+ if err != nil || !ok {
+ return ok, err
+ }
+
+ // Check client's address is listed in the client addresses in the ticket
+ if len(a.Ticket.DecryptedEncPart.CAddr) > 0 {
+ //The addresses in the ticket (if any) are then searched for an address matching the operating-system reported
+ //address of the client. If no match is found or the server insists on ticket addresses but none are present in
+ //the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error is returned.
+ if !types.HostAddressesContains(a.Ticket.DecryptedEncPart.CAddr, cAddr) {
+ return false, NewKRBError(a.Ticket.SName, a.Ticket.Realm, errorcode.KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR, "client address not within the list contained in the service ticket")
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Decrypt authenticator with session key from ticket's encrypted part
+ err = a.DecryptAuthenticator(a.Ticket.DecryptedEncPart.Key)
+ if err != nil {
+ return false, NewKRBError(a.Ticket.SName, a.Ticket.Realm, errorcode.KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY, "could not decrypt authenticator")
+ }
+
+ // Check CName in authenticator is the same as that in the ticket
+ if !a.Authenticator.CName.Equal(a.Ticket.DecryptedEncPart.CName) {
+ return false, NewKRBError(a.Ticket.SName, a.Ticket.Realm, errorcode.KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH, "CName in Authenticator does not match that in service ticket")
+ }
+
+ // Check the clock skew between the client and the service server
+ ct := a.Authenticator.CTime.Add(time.Duration(a.Authenticator.Cusec) * time.Microsecond)
+ t := time.Now().UTC()
+ if t.Sub(ct) > d || ct.Sub(t) > d {
+ return false, NewKRBError(a.Ticket.SName, a.Ticket.Realm, errorcode.KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW, fmt.Sprintf("clock skew with client too large. greater than %v seconds", d))
+ }
+ return true, nil
+}